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This dissertation provides efficient techniques to solve two-level optimization 
problems. Three specific types of problems are considered. The first problem is 
robust optimization, which has direct applications to engineering design. 
Traditionally robust optimization problems have been solved using an inner-outer 
structure, which can be computationally expensive. This dissertation provides a 
method to decompose and solve this two-level structure using a modified Benders 
decomposition. This gradient-based technique is applicable to robust optimization 
problems with quasiconvex constraints and provides approximate solutions to 
problems with nonlinear constraints. The second types of two-level problems 
considered are mathematical and equilibrium programs with equilibrium constraints. 
Their two-level structure is simplified using Schur‟s decomposition and reformulation 
  
schemes for absolute value functions. The resulting formulations are applicable to 
game theory problems in operations research and economics. The third type of two-
level problem studied is discretely-constrained mixed linear complementarity 
problems. These are first formulated into a two-level mathematical program with 
equilibrium constraints and then solved using the aforementioned technique for 
mathematical and equilibrium programs with equilibrium constraints. The techniques 
for all three problems help simplify the two-level structure into one level, which helps 
gain numerical and application insights. The computational effort for solving these 
problems is greatly reduced using the techniques in this dissertation. Finally, a host of 
numerical examples are presented to verify the approaches. Diverse applications to 
economics, operations research, and engineering design motivate the relevance of the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Motivation and Objective 
Mathematical modeling of problems arising in engineering and economics often 
requires formulations where optimal decisions need to be made at two different 
levels. These levels can be distinguished by time, space, decision choices, or even 
sets of players.  An optimal decision at each level, we assume, can be obtained using 
an optimization problem. 
 Consider some of many types of decisions made by the computer processor 
manufacturer Intel. First while making the processor, manufacturing errors and 
uncertainty can lead to their “best” design being infeasible. If not infeasible, the 
design might not be the best choice under uncertainty. This decision needs to be made 
accounting for the uncertainty or errors that can develop after manufacturing the 
product. Second, while deciding the price (or quantity) of the processor, Intel would 
have to take into account what its competitors are doing and if the government has 
made any regulations regarding taxation or distribution. Setting a price, thus, not only 
depends on Intel‟s own costs but the strategy of other actors at a different level than 
Intel. Finally, Intel needs to decide the number of processors to ship to specific 
locations. Even considering a simplified version of the market makes this a complex 
problem as network dynamics, transportation costs, and local demand all weigh into 
the decision. But, more importantly, the processors can only be transported in positive 





 All the problems classified above fall under the umbrella of two-level 
problems. The first decision, regarding uncertainty, requires the initial proposed 
design of the chip to be such that the presence of uncertainty does not cause the 
design to be infeasible and/or suboptimal. The decision is thus made to ensure 
feasibility of design constraints as well as minimum variation in a design‟s 
performance under uncertainty. Such a problem will be described in this dissertation 
as a Robust Optimization problem.  
 The second type of problem about making a profit-maximizing decision with 
other players present in a non-cooperative competitive environment is known as a 
Stackelberg Game in economics and falls under the broad heading of Mathematical 
Programs with Equilibrium Constraints or MPECs. These problems have a wide 
variety of applications, and in their general form can encompass robust optimization 
problems as well. A special class of MPECs with certain mathematical properties will 
be considered in this dissertation along with their extension to Equilibrium Programs 
with Equilibrium Constraints or EPECs.  
 The third problem is about solving non-cooperative games as well, except the 
decision at the second level is to make sure that the choice made is integer rather than 
continuous. This is more of a computational issue, but nevertheless the techniques to 
solve such problems have important applications.  These problems fall into the class 
of Discretely-Constrained Mixed Linear Complementarity Problems or (DC-MLCPs).          
 The two levels are a common feature to all these problems, and the biggest 
challenge to overcome this two-level structure is computational time. A nested 





and/or decision space  (Bialas & Karwan, 1982).  The focus of this dissertation is on 
developing decomposition based solution techniques that reduce computational effort 
significantly for these three types of problems. These new techniques will then be 
implemented on a variety of examples from engineering and energy markets. 
1.2. Research Components 
1.2.1. Solving Robust Optimization Problems 
The goal of robust optimization problems is to find an optimal solution that is 
minimally sensitive to uncertain factors. Uncertain factors can include inputs to the 
problem such as parameters, decision variables, or both. Given any combination of 
possible uncertain factors, a solution is said to be robust if it is feasible and the 
variation in its objective function value is acceptable within a given user-specified 
range. Previous approaches for general nonlinear robust optimization problems under 
interval uncertainty involve nested optimization and are not computationally 
tractable. The overall objective in this dissertation is to develop an original and 
efficient robust optimization method that is scalable and does not contain nested 
optimization.  The proposed method is applied to a variety of numerical and 
engineering examples to test its applicability. Current results show that the approach 
is able to numerically obtain a locally optimal robust solution to problems with 
quasiconvex constraints (≤ type) and an approximate locally optimal robust solution 
to general nonlinear optimization problems. A portion of this research component has 






1.2.2. Solving Mathematical Programs and Equilibrium Problems with 
Equilibrium Constraints 
This dissertation presents an original method for solving mathematical programs and 
equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints (MPECs and EPECs). Schur‟s 
decomposition followed by two separate methods of approximating absolute-value 
functions are presented and used to solve large-scale MPECs. The advantage of this 
method over traditional methods for solving MPECs is that computational time is 
much lower, which is corroborated by numerical examples. An extension to solve 
EPECs is also presented, along with a small numerical example. Finally, an 
application of the method to an MPEC representing the United States natural gas 
market is given. A portion of this research component has been presented in  
(Siddiqui & Gabriel, 2011b) and  (Gabriel et al., 2011c). 
1.2.3. Solving Discretely-Constrained Mixed-Integer Linear 
Complementarity Problems 
This research thrust presents an original modification to a recent approach for solving 
discretely-constrained, mixed linear complementarity problems (DC-MLCPs). Such 
formulations include a variety of interesting and realistic models of which discretely-
constrained Nash games and network equilibrium problems are considered. A 
methodology is provided to solve Nash-Cournot energy production games allowing 
some variables to be discrete. Normally, these games can be stated as mixed 
complementarity problems but only permit continuous variables in order to make use 
of each producer's Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions. The proposed approach allows 





complementarity to avoid infeasible situations. A mixed-integer, linear program 
formulation is used to solve the DC-MLCP in which both complementarity as well as 
integrality are allowed to be relaxed. A portion of this research component has been 
presented in (Gabriel et al., 2011a) and (Gabriel et al., 2011b). 
1.3. Organization of Dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides 
background and a thorough literature review for the three proposed research 
components. Chapter 3 provides the proposed solution methodology for robust 
optimization problems. The chapter also provides several engineering applications as 
well as numerical examples. The chapter is concluded by an example of an 
application to a carbon emissions related problem. Chapter 4 provides details on the 
algorithm used to solve MPECs and EPECs as well as computational issues. The 
chapter also provides numerical examples to corroborate these approaches, as well as 
an application to the North American natural gas market. Chapter 5 provides the 
proposed solution technique for discretely-constrained mixed linear complementary 
problems with examples of discretely-constrained Nash games and energy networks. 
Chapter 6 provides conclusions and directions for future research.  Figure 1.1 displays 
the organization of this dissertation. Note that the dashed line shows that a technique 































Chapter 2: Definitions and Literature Review  
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter will provide the necessary background for two-level optimization 
problems including definitions, terminologies, and a thorough literature review. This 
chapter will initially give mathematical definitions of two-level problems, and explain 
how robust optimization, MPECs and EPECs, and DC-MLCPs can all be cast as two-
level problems. 
 While two-level problems can be shown to have a general formulation, each 
of the three different types considered in this dissertation need different treatment to 
come up with the most efficient solution. Although solving all three efficiently will 
involve the use of decomposition techniques, many other alternatives exist in the 
literature which will also be discussed. Finally, some preliminary mathematical ideas 
and traditional algorithms will also be introduced. 
 This chapter first goes through the definition and terminologies used in this 
dissertation. In particular, the next section defines each of the three two-level 
problems considered along with other definitions. A literature review is provided next 
followed by two preliminary topics.  
2.2. Definitions and Terminologies 
In general, the two-level optimization problems considered in this dissertation can be 















                                                                    (2.1) 
where the continuous variables u
nux  , l
nlx  are, respectively, the vector of 





is the joint feasible region between these sets of variables and )( uxS  is the solution 
set of the lower-level problem that can be an optimization problem, a nonlinear 
complementarity problem (NCP) (Cottle et al., 2009), or a variational inequality 
problem (VI)  (Faccinei & Pang, 2003).  Figure 2.1 shows a diagrammatic 
representation of a two-level problem where the nested structure is revealed. 
minimize f(xu,xl)
(Upper-Level Problem)





Figure 2.1: The Structure of a Two-Level Problem 
 
                                                 
 
1





2.2.1. Robust Optimization  
Table 2.1 describes the terminology used for robust optimization. 
Table 2.1: Definition of Terms for Robust Optimization 
Symbol Interpretation 
x Vector of decision variables 
f Objective function to be minimized 
)ˆ,( xxg j  Constraint functions of the form “≤ 0” 
x  Maximum deviations of uncertain variables from nominal 
values 
x̂  Deviations from nominal values of uncertain variables 
and parameters, respectively:  xxx  ,ˆ  
0f  User-specified tolerance for acceptable variation in 
objective function under uncertainty 
 
 The goal in robust optimization is to optimize the objective function with 
respect to uncertain decision variables x, satisfying all constraints and ensuring the 
objective function variation is kept within an acceptable range 0f , while accounting 
for uncertainty in decision variables. Specifically, this dissertation considers robust 
optimization problems of the form
2
:  
                                                 
 
2
 Note that equality constraints are considered to be formulated as two inequality constraints in 
formulation (2.2). Alternatively one can explore the approach for robust optimization with equality 





























                                                       (2.2) 
where f and g are continuously differentiable in both x and x̂ . Figure 2.2 
diagrammatically shows the structure of a robust optimization problem.  
Check Constraint Violation 
under Uncertainty






Figure 2.2: Representation of a Robust Optimization Problem 
 
In the next few paragraphs, terms used in this dissertation are defined. 
 
Definition 2.1: Quasiconvex Function: A function )ˆ,( xxg  is said to be quasiconvex 
in  xxx  ,ˆ if for all  xxx  ,ˆ ,  ),(),,(max)ˆ,( xxgxxgxxg    for all x  






Definition 2.2: Objective robustness: For a candidate point x
c
 objective robustness 









                                                         (2.3) 
 is satisfied for all  xxx  ,ˆ .  
  
 Thus, this inequality ensures that the maximum objective function variation 
stays below a certain predetermined maximal amount 0f when presented with 
deviations in uncertain variables and parameters. 
 
Definition 2.3: Feasibility robustness: For a candidate solution x
c
 if  
                       Jjxxg
c
j ,...,10)ˆ,(                                                        (2.4) 
is satisfied for all  xxx  ,ˆ  then feasibility robustness holds.  
  
 Note that equation (2.3) is just another constraint, so it can be easily 
incorporated into inequality (2.4) when stating a general formulation that only 
includes feasibility robustness. From this point on, inequality (2.3) will not be stated 
separately in any formulation but will be assumed to be incorporated in inequality 
(2.4). For a more detailed description on objective robustness, please refer to (Li et 
al., 2006).  
 






Definition 2.5: Locally optimal robust: For a robust optimization problem, a locally 
optimal robust solution x*, is a robust point such that there exists a neighboring set U 
of robust solutions for which x* is optimal ( Uxxfxf  ),(*)( ).  
 
It is essential that the neighboring set be made up of only robust points 
otherwise the term is ill-defined. There is also a global counterpart as defined below. 
 
Definition 2.6: Globally optimal robust: For a robust optimization problem, a 
globally optimal robust solution x*, is a robust point such that x* is optimal 
( xxfxf  ),(*)( ) in the feasible region. 
 
2.2.2. Mathematical and Equilibrium Programs with Equilibrium 
Constraints 
In general, a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints is given by 
3
 







                                                                        (2.5) 





ny are, respectively, the vector of 
upper-level, lower-level variables, 

f (x,y) is the upper-level single-objective 
                                                 
 
3
 Without loss of generality, we assume that the variables x and y are nonnegative, which is 







 is the joint feasible region between these sets of variables and 

S(x) is the 
solution set of the lower-level problem that can be an optimization problem, a 
nonlinear complementarity problem (NCP), or variational inequality problem  (Luo et 
al., 1996).  
 One focus of this dissertation is when S(x) is a solution to a nonlinear 
complementarity problem.  Having a function
nng : , a nonlinear 
complementarity problem is to find a vector 












                                                                           (2.6) 
















                                                                       (2.7) 
where yyx
nnn
yxg :),(  is a vector-valued function. 
 Similarly, an EPEC is defined as a game between N players at the top level 
where each top-level player solves an optimization problem of the form (2.7). Hence, 
an EPEC with a common lower-level for each of the N upper-level players typical of 
Stackelberg leaders in energy production with the rest of the market represented by 






















                                            (2.8) 
Figure 2.3 shows the diagrammatic representation
4
 for an MPEC and Figure 2.4 
shows the diagrammatic representation for an EPEC.  
                                                 
 
4
 Nash-Cournot in this diagram implies that an individual player solves their own optimization problem 






(Decides the value of x)
Nash-Cournot
(xfixed, y)
(Take x fixed and solve for y)
xy
 
Figure 2.3: Representation of an MPEC 
Nash-Cournot
(x, yfixed)
(Decides the value of x)
Nash-Cournot
(xfixed, y)
(Observe x and solve for y)
xy
  





2.2.3 Discretely-Constrained Mixed Linear Complementarity Problems 
It is not immediately obvious why the problem considered in this subsection is a two-
level problem. The problem in its original form is not, but it needs to be converted 
into a two-level form for the particular solution technique  (Gabriel et al., 2011a; 
Gabriel et al., 2011b) to be applicable. In general, a discretely-constrained mixed 
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                                   (2.9) 
 The indices for zi, i = 1, 2 are partitioned into continuous-valued (denoted by 
the set Ci) and discrete-valued variables (denoted by the set Di), i.e., 




 with the continuous variables shown first without loss of 
generality. From here on, unless otherwise indicated, the discrete sets, 
 ND ,...,1,01   and  212 ,...,1,0,1,..., NND   will be assumed with N, N1, N2, 
nonnegative integers.  
                                                 
 
5
 Here the superscript T denotes the transpose function. The symbol  denotes complementary which 





 Finding a solution to this DC-MLCP can be thought of as a two-level 
problem, even though (2.9) formulates it in one level. The upper level minimizes 
deviations from an integer solution and complementary, i.e., ensures that as close as 
possible to an integer solution is obtained while satisfying complementary conditions 
with a minimum deviation as well, while the lower level solves a complementary 
problem assuming some deviation from integers has been fixed at the upper level. 
Figure 2.5 shows the diagrammatic representation of a discretely-constrained mixed 
linear complementary problem, while the following formulation describes the two-
level formulation. Note that the first two inequality constraints and the first equality 
constraint (the first three constraints) form a complementary problem. Hence, the 
two-level structure
6
 is apparent in the following formulation. Chapter 5 will describe 
in detail how this two-level formulation is obtained. 
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(εfixed , ζfixed ,  z)
(Observe ε,ζ and solve for z)
ε,ζz
 




2.3. Overview of Previous Work 
2.3.1 Robust Optimization 
This dissertation‟s approach for solving robust optimization problems (hereafter 
referred to as the modified Benders method), which will be described in Chapter 3, 
will now be compared to previous methods. A comprehensive review of the literature 
was conducted and the main distinctions between the proposed modified Benders 
method and previous works are presented as follows.  
 The robust optimization problems in the proposed modified Benders method 





involved nonconvex constraint functions) constraint functions
7
.  This is more general 
than only considering linear constraint functions in the problem as reported in the 
literature (e.g., Balling et al., 1986; Ben-Tal & Nemirovski, 2002; Bertsimas & Sim, 
2006; Soyster, 1973) or quadratic (e.g., Li et al., 2011) as well as other versions 
involving convex programs (e.g., Ganzerli & Pantelides, 1999) or linearization to 
solve the problem (e.g., Balling et al., 1986). The modified Benders method is able to 
obtain exact locally optimal robust solutions to problems with quasiconvex 
constraints as well as non-convex quadratic programs, which no one method in the 
reported literature is able to achieve. Other approaches also consider distributions for 
uncertainty (e.g., Lee et al., 2009; Lagaros & Papadrakakis, 2007) while the approach 
of this dissertation looks at a worst-case analysis for interval uncertainty
8
 without any 
explicit probability distribution or a nested optimization structure. Moreover, the 
modified Benders method is able to handle large uncertainties which earlier methods 
                                                 
 
7
 In some cases, although not considered in this dissertation, a slightly stricter condition with convexity 
in the lower-level of the Benders decomposition method is needed. However, we did not encounter this 
in any of our test problems. A workaround to this problem is available in (Gabriel et al., 2010). This 
involves sampling the domain of the objective function of the lower-level optimization problem to 
determine the convex portions of this function. This numerical approximation scheme can be applied to 
the modified Benders method to determine convexity of the objective function of the lower-level 
optimization problem. 
8
 Note that this dissertation considers robust optimization problems with interval uncertainty, while 
there is a substantive amount of literature considering other types of uncertainty. Refer to (Bertsimas & 





(e.g., Balling et al., 1986; Soyster, 1973; Ganzerli & Pantelides, 1999) were not able 
to tackle.  
 The proposed approach preserves the computational tractability, theoretically 
and practically, of the deterministic (i.e., nominal) problems. By contrast, under 
interval uncertainty, the computational effort for previous methods (e.g., Gunawan & 
Azarm, 2004; Li et al., 2006) to obtain robust solutions is much higher than their 
deterministic counterparts. However, results from a variety of numerical experiments 
show that the computational effort of solving the robust optimization problems is not 
much greater than that of their deterministic counterparts for the modified Benders 
method. Moreover, the modified Benders method is scalable, in that by numerical 
tests, the number of function calls per iteration increases at most linearly (numerical 
result) with an increase in the number of variables, uncertainty variables, and 
constraints.  
 Since this dissertation‟s approach is based on gradient-based methods, a 
globally optimal robust solution can never be guaranteed for the complete class of 
continuous, non-convex problems. However, this dissertation uses the idea of a 
locally optimal robust solution, and shows that this approach can obtain a locally 
optimal robust solution for nonlinear robust optimization problems. 
 In addition to the uncertainty in the data of the problems (i.e., the parameters), 
interval uncertainty is considered in the decision variables corresponding to 
manufacturing tolerances, implementation errors, etc. where optimized values cannot 
be achieved exactly, which is very common in practical engineering applications. For 





Nemirovski, 2008; Lu et al., 2010; Qiu & Wang, 2010; Zhu & Ting, 2001), 
considering uncertainty in the decision variables may considerably change those 
formulations or increase the complexity of the problem. The approach in this 
dissertation, however, keeps the same formulation and obtains locally optimal robust 
solutions to these problems with not much greater computational effort than the 
deterministic problem. 
 There has been an abundance of literature modifying Benders decomposition 
method (Benders, 1962) to solve various types of optimization problems. However, to 
my knowledge, there have not been any modifications to Benders method that solve 
nonlinear robust optimization problems with interval uncertainty although Benders-
based robust optimization problems have been considered in other contexts. For 
example, (Velarde & Laguna, 2004) provided a Benders-based heuristic to solve the 
international source allocation problem. In this problem, a subset of international 
suppliers needs to be selected to meet local demand. The uncertainty is in the demand 
function parameters and exchange rates.  However, their approach did not consider 
uncertainty in variables. For their approach to work, they needed to include control 
variables, which change depending on the uncertainty scenario to provide an easier 
route to solution. The approach in this dissertation does not require the introduction of 
such variables. Also, their methodology can‟t be extended to general nonlinear robust 
optimization problems. Saito and Murota  (Saito & Murota, 2007) described a method 
to apply Benders decomposition to solve linear, mixed-integer, robust optimization 
problems with ellipsoidal uncertainty. However, this approach only works for linear 





specific robust spanning tree problem, while Ng et al.  (Ng et al., 2010) applied it to a 
specific semiconductor allocation problem that had uncertainty.  Again, both 
approaches are not applicable to continuous, nonlinear robust optimization problems 
with interval uncertainty and have not modified Benders decomposition in the way 
this dissertation does.  
 There are related topics to robust optimization such as anti-optimization (e.g.,  
(Qiu & Wang, 2010) and reliability-based design optimization (e.g., Zou & 
Mahadevan, 2006) that run into the same problems as described above of not being 
computationally tractable or only working for a certain simple type of problems. For 
example, Youn and Xi (Youn & Xi, 2009) modified a double loop problem (like 
robust optimization) into a single loop so that it becomes computationally easier. This 
work involves using an eigenvector dimension reduction method, and probability 
distributions, which may not be applicable to general nonlinear robust optimization 
problems.  Also, neither of these papers has techniques that include interval 
uncertainty in parameters, in decision variables, along with being computationally 
efficient. The modified Benders method of this dissertation is not only directly 
relevant to robust optimization, but it handles the specific two-level structure of 
robust optimization in a less computationally intensive way. 
2.3.3 Mathematical and Equilibrium Programs with Equilibrium 
Constraints 
Finding optimal points for mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints 
(MPECs) involves solving a two-level optimization where the lower level is an 





2009) as the lower level implies that the complementarity constraint is a non-convex 
bilinear multiplicative term.  
 Many techniques exist to solve MPECs (Luo et al., 1996) but a popular way 
such MPECs have been solved is by using a disjunctive-constraints technique 
(Fortuny-Amat & McCarl, 1981). However, the two biggest drawbacks of disjunctive 
constraints are that the method is computationally expensive for large models (Luo et 
al., 1996) and that selecting a particular constant in the method is often troublesome 
(Gabriel & Leuthold, 2010). The solution can be extremely sensitive to the selection 
of this constant, and be far from the true answer if not selected correctly. Other 
methods (Steffensen & Ulbrich, 2010) and (Uderzo, 2010) also exist but have not 
been shown to work for large-scale models.  
 This dissertation presents a new method for solving MPECs, based on 
handling the bilinear, non-convex term using Schur‟s Decomposition and Special 
Ordered Sets of Type 1 (SOS Type 1) variables (Gabriel et al., 2006), along with a 
reformulation technique for absolute value terms. This method is applied to solve a 
small Stackelberg game with the number of players allowed to vary and an MPEC for 
the U.S. natural gas market to validate the proposed approach. A proposed extension 
along with a simple example to solve equilibrium programs with equilibrium 
constraints (EPECs) is also provided.  
2.3.4. Discretely-Constrained Mixed Linear Complementarity Problems 
As discussed before, complementary problems have had several applications in the 
literature, including solving Nash-Cournot games and network problems. Both Nash-





problems by taking the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) (Bazaraa et al., 1993) conditions 
to each player‟s optimization problem and combining them (Cottle et al., 2009). 
 A lot of applications of both these problems relate to energy markets. For 
example, Bard (1983,1988) developed algorithms for linear and convex two-level 
programming problems with applications to energy. Continuing, Bard and Moore  
(Bard & Moore, 1990) introduced a branch and bound algorithm for two-level 
problems resulting from complementary problems. Karlof and Wang (Karlof & 
Wang, 1996) applied a two-level approach to solving a flow shop scheduling 
problem, while (Labbéb et al., 1998) applied it to a model of taxation and highway 
pricing. Moore and Bard (Moore & Bard, 1990) and Wen and Huang (Wen & Huang, 
1996) provided methods to solve mixed-integer two-level problems, but these 
methods are not applicable for solving DC-MLCPs.  
 More recently  (Bard et al., 2000), (Fuller, 2010), (Fuller, 2008), (Gabriel & 
Leuthold, 2010), (Gabriel et al., 2010), (Hu et al., 2009), (Marcotte et al., 2001), 
(O'Neill et al., 2005), and (Scaparra & Church, 2008) have had applications of game 
theory problems to energy but none has considered complementary problems which 
are discretely constrained. 
 In some cases, solutions to discretely-constrained complementary problems do 
not exist. This is because satisfying integrality and complementary conditions 
together can prove to be more difficult than satisfying integrality and complementary 
conditions individually. However, solutions to the original optimization problem 
whose KKT conditions were used to formulate the complementary problem might 





 (Gabriel et al., 2011a), (Gabriel et al., 2011b) provide ways around this, and 
provide a relaxation technique that is able to solve DC-MLCPs.    The distinguishing 
features of the proposed technique in both these papers with respect to other 
procedures reported in the technical literature (e.g., (Galiana et al., 2003), (Hogan & 
Ring, 2003), (Bjørndal & Jörnsten, 2008) are two-fold. First, the initial Nash-Cournot 
game or network problem is not manipulated to achieve prices that support market 
outcomes. Instead, optimality conditions of the original problem, with integrality and 
complementary conditions relaxed, are formulated and incorporated into a relaxation 
problem that allows realizing the tradeoff of integrality vs. complementarity. Second, 
instead of using a two-step procedure as in the literature, the technique in (Gabriel et 
al., 2011a) is single-step formulation of a two-level problem, and does not require 
altering the original problem by fixing integer variables to their optimal values to 
formulate a continuous problem. Hence this dissertation will concentrate on the work 
from the two papers (Gabriel et al., 2011a), (Gabriel et al., 2011b). 
 In both papers, (Gabriel et al., 2011a), (Gabriel et al., 2011b), however, 
disjunctive constraints (Fortuny-Amat & McCarl, 1981) are used to solve the 
resulting two-level problem. In this dissertation, a method developed in Chapter 4 
will be used to solve these problems instead of disjunctive constraints. This is the 
main contribution in this dissertation, in that the method of Chapter 4 solves the DC-
MLPCs much quicker than the disjunctive constraints method, and does not require 






2.4.1. Benders Decomposition 
This section describes standard Benders decomposition as a modified version will be 
used in Chapter 3. Table 2.2 describes the terminology used for explaining Benders 
decomposition. 
 
Table 2.2: Definition of Terms for Benders Decomposition 
Symbol Interpretation 
vc Complicating vector of variables to explain standard Benders 
decomposition 
vu Uncomplicating vector of variables to explain standard 
Benders decomposition 
c(vc) Constraints of complicating variable 
d(vc,vu) Constraints of uncomplicating and complicating Variables 
 
 Benders decomposition is used to efficiently solve linear and nonlinear 
programs (Conejo et al., 2006) and decomposes the original set of variables into both 
complicating and uncomplicating ones. Normally, integer variables are defined as 
complicating variables as fixing their values allows the problem to have a structure 
that provides an easy solution (assuming the rest of the problem is relatively easy to 
solve).  However, in general, the complicating variables need not be integer and can 
be real-valued which, if fixed, render a simple or decomposable problem. Using 
notation provided above, Benders decomposition seeks to solve an optimization 
















































                                                         (2.10) 
 To solve this problem, the Benders decomposition technique fixes values of 
cv  (which are part of a set U that can be integers or other subsets of
n ) and solves 
the problem after first decomposing into a master problem and sub-problem (Conejo 
et al., 2006). To explain these notions of master and sub-problem, first define an 
auxiliary function α(vc) as follows which  expresses the objective function of the 
original problem as a function solely of the complicating variables. 















                                                          (2.11) 
Using the definition of α(vc), the original problem (2.10) can be expressed as follows.  












                                                                           (2.12) 
 Iteratively, a subproblem (2.13) is solved to approximate α(vc) from above by 
fixing values of the complicating variables )(
fixed
cc vv    and obtaining the dual 























                                                       (2.13) 
 Then, the solution to the above problem,  soluv  and the dual variables  sol  
are used to construct “Benders cuts” in the master problem to approximate the 
function
9
 α(vc) from below. Note that these cuts are iteratively added at each step 
until convergence. For simplicity, only one cut is shown here. 























                                 (2.14) 
 Since the master problem (2.14) has a larger feasible region, it provides a 
lower bound (zlo) while the more restricted subproblem (2.13) provides an upper 
bound (zup) for the solution objective function value. These problems are solved 
iteratively until (zup – zlo)/( zlo) is less than some tolerance. As long as the function 
α(vc) is convex, Benders decomposition converges to an optimal solution (Conejo et 
al., 2006). 
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 A sufficient condition for convergence is that the objective function in formulation (2.11) needs to be 
convex. However, the modification this paper presents, from the experimental results, does not need 
this convexity as the Benders cuts are modified. For more information, please refer to (Conejo et al., 





2.4.2. Disjunctive Constraints 
From (2.7), the set of solutions to  
                        0),( yxgyT                                                                       (2.15) 
is nonconvex and can be computationally challenging to find even if ),( yxg  is linear. 
 One way is to use disjunctive constraints (Fortuny-Amat & McCarl, 1981). A 
large constant K is introduced, which can be difficult to select and cause 
computational issues (Gabriel & Leuthold, 2010), as well as a vector of binary 
variables r. Then, (2.8) is rewritten as  
 
constant large a is  


















                                (2.16) 
 For large enough K, the solution set to (2.16) is equivalent to that of (2.7). The 
binary vectors and large K force componentwise, at least one of y or g to be 0. 
However, choosing K too small can cause errors in problem formulation (Gabriel & 
Leuthold, 2010) while choosing K too large can cause the condition number of the 
optimization problem (Renegar, 1995), (Renegar, 1994) to be high and result in 
numerical errors. One of the main aims of this section is to get around this problem 





2.4.3. Approximating Nonlinear Functions using SOS Type 1 and Type 2 
Variables 
Note that disjunctive constraints are used to state disjunctive (either/or) logic 
statements. Hence, Chapter 4 will provide a different way to state such logic 
statements mathematically. For this, a reformulation of the absolute value function 
will be required, for which special ordered sets will be used.  
 
Definition 2.7: A Special Ordered Set of Type One (SOS1 or SOS Type 1) is 
defined to be a set of non-negative variables for which at most one member from 
the set may be non-zero in a feasible solution. There are no other restrictions on the 
elements of the set, and they can be ordered in any way.  
 
 Among the uses for SOS1 variables, one popular one is to approximate 
functions. For example, consider a nonlinear function g(x) over a closed interval 
],[ highlow xxx  on the positive real line. Given a partition of n points of the 





 can be introduced to approximate this nonlinear function. Then, g(x) can be 






































                                                 (2.17) 



















 Similarly, a piecewise approximation can also be developed using SOS Type 
2 variables. 
 
Definition 2.8: A Special Ordered Set of type Two (SOS 2 or SOS Type 2) is a set 
of nonnegative consecutive variables in which not more than two adjacent 
members may be non-zero in a feasible solution. No other restrictions are placed 
on the set.  
 
 Again, consider a nonlinear function g(x) over a closed interval 
],[ highlow xxx  on the real line. Given a partition of n points of the 





 can be introduced to approximate this nonlinear function. Then, g(x) can be 
expressed as  

































                                                (2.18) 
Figure 2.7 shows this nonlinear function being approximated by SOS Type 2 














Figure 2.7: Approximation of Nonlinear Functions using SOS Type 2 
Variables 
 
 The downside of SOS Type 2 variables is, of course, that it requires much 
more computational power than if SOS Type 1 variables were used. In Chapter 4, 
however, an absolute value function will be used. Hence, setting g(x) = |x|. For this 
purpose, only a set of two SOS Type 1 variables is required to reformulate this over 
the entire range. This is described by the following formulation. 
















 Since these variables encompass the whole range, no restriction on the sum 






Chapter 3: Solving Robust Optimization Problems Using a 
Modified Benders Method  
3.1. Introduction 
Engineering optimization problems often involve uncontrollable variations or 
uncertainties in factors like decision variables and/or parameters. Optimal solutions 
that might be deterministically feasible often end up being infeasible for a given 
realization of uncertain factors. Additionally, even small levels of variations can 
cause large degradations in the objective function value. Manufacturing errors, 
measurement problems, and uncertainty in environmental conditions are examples of 
sources for these variations.   
 Uncertainty can be handled with or without a probability distribution. 
Optimization problems that involve probability distributions are referred to as 
stochastic optimization problems. These are more suited for situations where 
accounting for worst-case uncertainty might result in foregoing performance. 
Optimization problems in this chapter are more suited for situations where any 
violation of constraints under uncertainty could result in the solution being unsuitable. 
Hence, a worst-case analysis needs to be appropriate for problems considered in this 
chapter.  
 In this section, an approach for robust optimization, e.g., (Ben-Tal et al., 
2009), for linear, quadratic, convex, and non-convex programs is developed by 







, but only intervals with a nominal point (user- or problem-
defined) are used to represent the uncertainty in decision variables and/or parameters. 
The problem structure in this dissertation reflects a real-world design situation, e.g., 
when information about uncertain factors during the early stages of a design process 
is often limited.   
 The two-level structure is apparent in robust optimization problems. The 
upper-level of a robust optimization problem is a decision based on a fixed level of 
uncertainty. The lower-level checks the feasibility of an optimal solution obtained 
from the upper-level. This chapter provides a way to decompose this two-level 
structure using Benders decomposition to solve the robust optimization problem. A 
portion of the material in this chapter has been presented previously, see (Siddiqui et 
al., 2011a) and (Siddiqui et al., 2011c). 
3.2. Interval Uncertainty 
A simple example will be presented first to motivate this method. Consider the 
optimization problem 
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 The statement that no probability distribution being presumed is to ensure the fact that probability 
does not come into play in any part of the discussed formulation. For instance, a uniform distribution 
over the whole interval of uncertainty can be assumed. However, the solution technique for robust 
optimization would involve solving the problem while ensuring there is a zero probability of constraint 
























                                                         (3.1) 
























                                (3.2) 
 Note that parameter uncertainty has been introduced in the constraints of the 
problem. Realize also that, for example, if 1.0ˆˆ 21  xx  in the first constraint of (3.2), 
then if x1 and x2 satisfy the following inequality 
8)1.01()1.01( 21  xx                                                     (3.3) 








                                                 (3.4) 
 Hence, this “trick” can be applied to all parameters and we can get an 
optimization problem which will give us a robust solution. This approach will also 
define a robust feasible region which is the subset of the feasible region that only 
contains points feasible under worst case uncertainty as shown above. Figure 3.1 
shows a comparison of the original feasible region (3.1) and the resulting robust 
feasible region (3.5), and the constraint functions of following equation (3.5) define 

































 Since this is a linear program, a solution will be one of the corner points of the 
feasible region. The solution to the deterministic problem (3.1) is x1 = 1, x2 = 7, f(x) = 
-15. The solution to the robust problem (3.2) can be found by looking at the corner 
points of the robust feasible region which gives x1 = 1, x2 = 69/11 (approximately 
6.27), f(x) = -149/11 (approximately -13.54). Clearly, finding this robust feasible 
region greatly simplifies the robust optimization problem. The motivation behind the 
modified Benders method was to find this feasible region and then solve the easier 
optimization problem (3.5).  
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 Both the feasible region and the robust feasible region are the regions enclosed by the respective 





 Recall that the formulation from Chapter 2 for robust optimization problems 
















                                                         (3.6) 
 The end goal of this chapter is to solve problem (3.6). The method used is a 
modification of Benders decomposition to be described later. As described in Section 
2.4.1, Benders decomposition decomposes an optimization problem into a master 
problem and a subproblem, with the variables being divided into complicating and 
uncomplicating ones. In (3.6), x are the uncomplicating variables and x̂  are the 
complicating ones. As in Benders decomposition, an auxiliary function of x̂  will be 
defined. A set of theoretical results will then be proven about the complicating 
variables x̂  and the auxiliary function.  The first set of theoretical results will show 
that an application of standard Benders decomposition to (3.6) when the objective and 
constraint functions are linear will yield a globally optimal robust solution (Algorithm 
3.1). Then, an assumption on the quasiconvexity of the constraint functions )ˆ,( xxg j  
will be made to simplify the application of a modified Benders decomposition. This 
modified Benders decomposition with modified Benders cuts will then be applied to 
solve (3.6) when the constraint functions )ˆ,( xxg j  are quasiconvex (heuristic 
Algorithm 3.2). Finally, a third heuristic is also presented which can be used to solve 
(3.6) when the constraint functions )ˆ,( xxg j  are nonlinear (not necessarily 





 To prove the theoretical results in this chapter, certain assumptions have to be 
made about optimization problem (3.6). In Section 2.2.1, assumptions on the 
functions f and gj being continuous were stated. While the new Assumptions 3.1 and 
3.2 may be relaxed for numerical application of the algorithms presented later, the 
theoretical results depend on them. The following are these assumptions and they 
have to do with the existence of solutions. 
 
Assumption 3.1: The constraints gj in (3.6), for any fixed value of uncertainty x̂ , 
form a convex, compact, nonempty feasible region over x.  
 
Assumption 3.2: A globally optimal robust solution to (3.6) always exists.  
 
 Assumption 3.1 ensures that continuous functions gj, j = 1,…, J are over a 
nonempty compact set so they obtain their maximum within this set via the 
Weierstrass Theorem (Royden, 1988). The convexity of the feasible region is 
included to ensure that a gradient-based algorithm can be applied successfully. 
Assumption 3.2 is stronger, and assumes that a solution exists to the robust 
optimization problem, while Assumption 3.1 does not take into account the 
],[ˆ xxx   clause in (3.6). Existence of solutions to robust optimization problems 
are difficult to prove. The presence of uncertainty means that with large enough 
values of |Δx|, there may not be even a feasible solution to the robust optimization 
problem, let alone a globally optimal robust solution. However, for example, problem 





solvers which could detect if an optimization problem did not have a feasible 
solution.  
   The goal is to obtain values of x such that the formulation (3.6) gives an 
optimal solution to x regardless of the values of x̂ . Since this chapter only considers 
the worst-case analysis, the method aims to get the “worst” values of x̂  for this 
problem (3.6). These are called “interval-optimal” values, as defined next.  
 
Definition 3.1:  Interval-optimal:  An interval-optimal value for a particular 
candidate solution x
c
 and a constraint function gj (for one j = 1,…, J) is defined as a 
point  xxxc  ,ˆ  such that )ˆ,()ˆ,( ccj
c
j xxgxxg   for all realizations of 
 xxx  ,ˆ . The point  xxxc  ,ˆ  is a particular value of the x̂  such that the 
constraint attains its maximum value at that particular value of uncertainty.    
 
 An interval-optimal point can be thought of as the value of uncertainty x̂  that 
maximizes the value of gj over all other realizations of uncertainty for a fixed value of 
x. The next definition takes this further. 
 
Definition 3.2: Globally Interval-optimal:  A globally interval-optimal value for a 
particular candidate solution x
c
 and set of constraint functions gj; j = 1,…, J; is 
defined as a point  xxxc  ,ˆ  such that )ˆ,(max)ˆ,( ccj
j
c
j xxgxxg   for all 
realizations of  xxx  ,ˆ . The point  xxxc  ,ˆ  is a particular value of the 
x̂  such that the constraints attain their global maximum value at that particular value 






 Note that any globally interval-optimal point is interval-optimal for at least 
one of the constraint functions gj, j = 1,…, J. From example (3.2), for the constraint 











xc  x1 = 1, x2 = 69/11 the associated interval-
optimal value of x̂  is 1.0ˆ ix , i = 1,…, 6. This also happens to be the associated 
globally interval-optimal value of x̂  for the solution x1 = 1, x2 = 69/11  and the set of 
constraints g1, g2,  g3. 
 The following lemma makes the connection between a robust point and its 
globally interval-optimal point. In equation (3.5), the globally interval-optimal values 
of the uncertainty elements helped determine the robust solution. Lemma 3.1 further 
strengthens this connection between a robust point and a globally interval-optimal 
point.      
  
Lemma 3.1: A candidate solution (x
c
) for problem (3.6) is a robust point if and 
only if its globally interval-optimal point  
],[ˆ xxxc   






) is a robust point (Definition 2.4), then it must be true that 
0)ˆ,(max xxg cj
j
 for all realizations of  xxx  ,ˆ . Hence, this implies that for 
the associated globally interval-optimal point )ˆ( cx , 0)ˆ,(max ccj
j





 xxxc  ,ˆ . For the other side of the if and only if argument, suppose the 
associated globally interval-optimal point has 0)ˆ,(max ccj
j
xxg . Then by the 
definition of globally interval-optimal, 0)ˆ,(max xxg cj
j
 for all realizations of 
 xxx  ,ˆ  which implies that (xc) is a robust point.■     
 
 The next step is to relate Definition 3.2 to Benders decomposition as 
explained in Section 2.4.1. The robust optimization problem (3.6) will be solved 
using a modification of Benders decomposition. In this modification, the uncertainty 
variables x̂  will be the complicating variables. Since there is a need for an auxiliary 





















                                                        (3.7) 
 Before proceeding, it is important to define one more term and make an 
assumption. The next definition is a slightly different one than Definitions 3.1 and 
3.2, but is related to our motivation for finding interval-optimal points using a 
modified Benders decomposition. 
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 By Assumption 3.2, a solution to (3.7) always exists. This is because the optimization problem (3.7) 





Definition 3.3: Worst-Case Uncertainty: A worst-case uncertainty value 
 xxxwc  ,ˆ  for optimization problem (3.6) is such that when 
wcxx ˆˆ  is fixed in 


















                                                         (3.8) 
 Note that a worst-case uncertainty value differs from an interval-optimal or 
globally interval-optimal value of uncertainty in that a worst-case uncertainty value 
does not have an associated predetermined variable x (but it is associated with a 
globally optimal robust solution after solving (3.8)) and is for the entire optimization 
problem. But it is trivial to note that a worst-case uncertainty value of x̂  is a globally 
interval-optimal point of uncertainty for some globally optimal robust solution. The 
next assumption is required for the theoretical background of the modified Benders 
decomposition presented in this chapter.  
 
Assumption 3.3: A worst-case uncertainty value exists for robust optimization 
problem (3.6) and is a globally interval-optimal point for a globally optimal robust 
solution x*. 
 
 Note that Assumption 3.3 ensures that finding worst-case uncertainty values 





of a robust optimization problem where 1.0ˆ ix , i = 1,…, 6 was figured out to be the 
worst-case uncertainty value.  
 As an example, linear programs satisfy Assumption 3.3. In general, a linear 








ˆ)ˆ,( where C is a 






















iij  for all  xxx  ,ˆ . Therefore, the interval-
optimal value of ix̂ can be calculated to be ix if di is positive and ix  if di is 
negative. From this argument, for all the gj constraints a globally interval-optimal 
value can be calculated and so can a worst-case uncertainty value. For more 
information on problems that satisfy Assumption 3.3, please refer to (Ben-Tal et al., 
2009). 
 The following lemma shows a property of the new auxiliary function (3.7) 
which connects a globally optimal robust point to its globally interval-optimal point. 
This will later be used in modifying Benders decomposition to obtain solutions to 
robust optimization problems.  
 Recall that for problem (3.2), the globally optimal robust point was x1 = 1, x2 
= 69/11 and its associated globally interval-optimal point (and the worst-case 
uncertainty value) was 1.0ˆ ix , i = 1,…, 6. Note that for example (3.2), 





robust solution to example (3.2). This is no coincidence as shown by the following 
lemma. 
 
Lemma 3.2: Under Assumptions 3.1-3.3, let x* be a globally optimal robust 
solution (Definition 2.6) to (3.6) and *x̂  an associated globally interval-optimal 
point. If (i) )ˆ(*)ˆ( xx uu    for all realizations of  xxx  ,ˆ  , then 
(ii) *)(*)ˆ( xfxu  . 
Proof: Since x* is a globally optimal robust point, it is automatically a robust point 
(Definition 2.6) so by Lemma 3.1, 0)ˆ*,(max xxg j
j
 for all realizations of 
 xxx  ,ˆ . Note that the value *)ˆ(xu  was calculated by minimizing f(x) while 
fixing *ˆˆ xx   in (3.7).  Since x* is in the feasible region for (3.7) and by Assumption 
3.2, a solution always exists to (3.7), *)(*)ˆ( xfxu  . The next step will show with 
the help of a contradiction argument that *)(*)ˆ( xfxu  .  
 Suppose that *)(*)ˆ( xfxu  .  By the statement of this lemma, 
)ˆ(*)ˆ( xx uu    for all  xxx  ,ˆ . Using (3.7) by fixing *ˆˆ xx  , let 'x  
(dependent on *x̂ )  be a solution to the minimization problem in (3.7) such that 
)'(*)ˆ( xfxu  . Then (i) implies )ˆ()'( xxf u  for all  xxx  ,ˆ . By our 
contradictory assumption, this also implies )ˆ()'(*)ˆ(*)( xxfxxf uu    which 
simplifies to )ˆ(*)( xxf u  for all  xxx  ,ˆ . Note that the condition 
)ˆ(*)( xxf u  for all  xxx  ,ˆ  violates Assumption 3.3. By Assumption 3.3, 





that )ˆ(*)( wcu xxf  . But this would imply )ˆ()ˆ( xx u
wc
u    for all  xxx  ,ˆ  
which is a contradiction. Hence, this contradiction shows that     *)(*)ˆ( xfxu  . 
Combining the two inequalities *)(*)ˆ( xfxu   and *)(*)ˆ( xfxu   gives 
*)(*)ˆ( xfxu  .■   
  
 The next two theorems form the basis of the modified Benders method to be 
introduced later in this chapter. The first shows a particular characteristic of a worst-
case value of uncertainty. The second shows that a particular characteristic of an 
uncertainty variable value can be used to find a globally optimal robust solution.  The 
modified Benders method of this chapter will aim to find this value. 
 
Theorem 3.1: Under Assumptions 3.1-3.3, let the worst-case value of uncertainty 
for (3.6) be 
wcx̂ . Then, )ˆ()ˆ( xx u
wc
u    for all realizations of  .,ˆ xxx    
Proof: Let x* be a globally optimal robust solution to (3.6). Then, by Definition 3.3,  
*)()ˆ( xfxwcu  . Problem (3.6) has the same objective function as (3.7) but the 
feasible region of (3.6) is a subset of the feasible region of (3.7). Therefore, for any 
fixed x̂  )ˆ(*)( xxf u . Therefore, )ˆ()ˆ( xx u
wc
u    for all realizations of 
 .,ˆ xxx  ■   
 
Theorem 3.2: Under Assumptions 3.1-3.3, suppose there exists a unique 
uncertainty value 
cx̂  for which )ˆ()ˆ( xx u
c





 xxx  ,ˆ . Then, a solution to optimization problem (3.9) will be a globally 


















                                                       (3.9) 
Proof: Let x
c
 be a solution to (3.9). Note that )()ˆ( ccu xfx   by (3.7). By 
Assumption 3.3, there exists a worst-case uncertainty value wcx̂  such that 
*)()ˆ( xfxwcu  , where *x  is a globally optimal robust solution.  Since *x  is a 
solution to (3.6), it is also feasible to (3.9) as the feasible region for (3.6) is a subset 
of the feasible region for (3.9). Hence, *)()( xfxf c  , which implies 
)ˆ()ˆ( wccu xx   . But according to the statement of this theorem,  )ˆ()ˆ( xx u
c
u    for 
all realizations of  xxx  ,ˆ . Hence, wcc xx ˆˆ   because this theorem also states 
that this value of cx̂  is unique. Therefore, wcc xx ˆˆ  . By Definition 3.3, (3.9) gives a 
globally optimal robust solution.  ■           
  
 The purpose of Theorem 3.2 is that if the following optimization problem 
13
 
(3.10) has a unique solution, that solution can be used to find the solution to (3.6). 
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 Note that the function )ˆ(xu  is not known in closed form but will be later be approximated using a 





















                                                                     (3.10) 
 Theorem 3.2 also shows that finding globally interval-optimal points can help 
us obtain a globally optimal robust solution. For quasiconvex constraint functions, we 
know that the globally interval-optimal values will lie on one of the endpoints of the 
vector interval
14
  xx  , , which follows directly from the definition of 
quasiconvexity provided in Chapter 2 and is taken advantage of in the following 
Corollary 3.1. Note that there are u
n
2 such endpoints, where nu is the dimension of the 
vector x  and also the dimension of the endpoints. For purposes of notation, let the 
endpoints of the vector interval be denoted by (V)1, (V)2, (V)3, …, unV 2)( . Each 
endpoint vector (V)k , k = 1,…, u
n
2  is defined such that each of its elements (Vi)k is 
either Δxi or –Δxi, i.e.,    iiki xxV  ,  for i = 1,…, nu.   The idea that the 
maximum of the constraint functions lies on one of the endpoints of the vector 
interval can be used to ascertain that any globally interval-optimal point (and thus, 
worst-case uncertainty value) will also lie on one of the endpoints of the vector 
interval. 
 
Corollary 3.1: If the constraint functions gj , j = 1,…, J are quasiconvex in (3.6), 
then solving (3.11) is equivalent to solving (3.6) and solving (3.12) is equivalent to 
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 This vector interval  xx  ,  is of nu dimensions. So the endpoints of this vector interval are 





solving (3.7). Additionally, the maximum value of )ˆ(xu  is achieved at one of the 





















































                                                       (3.12) 
Proof: The aim of this theorem is to show that if gj, for all j = 1,…, J is quasiconvex 








  can replace the condition ],[ˆ xxx   in (3.6). Note that  
 ),(),,(max)))(1()(,()ˆ,( ijijiijij xxgxxgxxxgxxg    for all 
]1,0[  and a real-valued  iii xxx  ,ˆ .  For any x, if 








  because 















 , then 
0)ˆ,( xxg j , ],[ˆ xxx   because gj is quasiconvex in x̂ . Hence, 






















= 1,…, J is quasiconvex in x̂ .  Therefore, solving (3.11) is the same as solving (3.6) 
and solving (3.7) is the same as solving (3.12). 









 is an interval-optimal value. Moreover, a value of 















 is a globally interval-
optimal value of x̂ . Hence, the globally interval-optimal values of x̂  lie on the 






. In particular, by Assumption 3.3, a worst-case value of 
uncertainty wcx̂  for problem (3.11) exists and is a globally interval-optimal value. 
Hence, wcx̂  also lies on one of the endpoints. By Theorem 3.1, )ˆ()ˆ( xx u
wc
u    for 
all realizations of  xxx  ,ˆ , which is the maximum value of )ˆ(xu . Hence, the 
maximum value of )ˆ(xu  is achieved at one of the endpoints.■           
 
 The next section provides a modified Benders decomposition method to solve 
robust linear programs. Note that so far we have proven facts about the auxiliary 
function )ˆ(xu . Standard Benders decomposition approximates this function using 
standard Benders cuts. With the support of theoretical results, the first algorithm in 
the next chapter will apply standard Benders decomposition to obtain a solution to 
(3.6). Two further heuristic algorithms are provided to solve (3.6) when the constraint 





3.3 Modified Benders Decomposition 
3.3.1. Formulation of Approach: Solving Robust Linear Programs 
The strategy will be to find optimal values for variables x and interval-optimal values 
for x̂ . One can think of this as attempting to check the robustness of a candidate 
solution by partitioning the uncertainty interval and checking feasibility at each point. 
Clearly, if all constraints are feasible when fixed with the interval-optimal values for 
uncertainty elements, then the candidate solution is robust.  
 Standard Benders decomposition is advantageous when the problem structure 
dictates that fixing certain variables will lead to a simpler problem to solve. The idea 
behind Benders decomposition is to fix a set of complicating variables and solve a 
resulting simpler subproblem while iterating between it and solving a master problem 
that computes values for the complicating variables. The robust optimization problem 
(3.6) also has a simple structure when certain variables are fixed. Fixing x̂  results in 
an optimization problem much simpler to solve than a robust optimization problem. 
     The Benders cuts added in (2.14) serve to approximate the function α 
described in (2.11). Since the objective function in (3.7) is being maximized by 
equation (3.10), for the successful application of Benders decomposition, the function 
)ˆ(xu  needs to be concave.  
 
Theorem 3.3: For linear objective and constraint functions in (3.6), the function 





Proof: This is a well-known result from linear programming theory (Murty, 1983). 
The function )ˆ(xu  is piecewise-linear, continuous, and concave. ■ 
  
 Because Theorem 3.2 requires a unique maximum value of x̂  to guarantee a 
solution, the following lemma gives conditions under which this is possible for linear 
robust optimization problems. Before proceeding, the definition of a slope between 
two points is needed. 
 
Definition 3.4: Slope: The slope of the function RRy u
n
u :)(  between two vectors 
uu nn RyRy  21 ,  is defined as the vector u
n











  for each 
element i = 1,…, nu. 
 
Lemma 3.3: Let )ˆ(xu  be a piecewise linear, continuous, concave function over 
],[ xx  . Then )ˆ(xu  achieves its maximum at a point ],[ˆ xxx
wc  . Now 







suppose the slope between wcx̂  and any other vector ],[ˆ xxx  is nonzero 
(every element of the slope between the two points is nonzero). Then )ˆ(xu  has a 
unique maximum. 
Proof: Since )ˆ(xu  is a continuous function over a nonempty compact set, the vector 
interval ],[ xx  , by the Weierstrass theorem (Royden, 1988) )ˆ(xu  achieves its 













 , which is one of the 
endpoints . We want to show that this point is unique. This proof will follow a 
contradiction argument. Suppose there exists another distinct point wcxx ˆ'ˆ   such that 
)'ˆ()ˆ( xx u
wc
u    and )ˆ()'ˆ( xx uu    for all ],[ˆ xxx  . Since )ˆ(xu  has nonzero 
slope between wcx̂  and any other point in ],[ xx  , there exists a point mx̂   such that 
wcmm xxxx ˆˆ,'ˆˆ   which is a strict convex combination of wcx̂  and  'x̂  such that 
)ˆ()ˆ( wcu
m
u xx   . Hence, there exists a )1,0( such that 'ˆ)1(ˆˆ xxx
wcm   . 
Since )ˆ(xu  is concave, )'ˆ()1()ˆ()ˆ( xxx
wcm    which implies 
)ˆ()ˆ( wcm xx    because )'ˆ()ˆ( xx u
wc
u   . But we had assumed that 
)ˆ()ˆ( wcu
m
u xx    so it must be that )ˆ()ˆ(
wcm xx   . This is a contradiction as it 
violates the statement in the theorem that a maximum is achieved at one of the 
endpoints. Therefore, the assumption )'ˆ()ˆ( xx u
wc
u    ends up concluding a 
contradictory result and )ˆ(xu  has a unique maximum. ■ 
  
 The use of wcx̂  as the notation for the point where )ˆ(xu  achieves its 
maximum was not coincidental. It is used to relate the result of Lemma 3.3 to 
Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.1.   Note that there exist other functions than linear that 
are both concave and achieve their maximum at an endpoint of their interval domain. 
Examples are log(y) over [1,100], -y
2
 over [0,1], etc.  The following is Algorithm 3.1 







Algorithm 3.1 (Standard Benders Method): 
 
Step 0: Set iteration counter (it) to 0. Pick a small positive constant for tolerance (tol). 
 

















                                                                    (3.13) 
The bounds on 
u  are user-defined
15
 depending on the problem. Solving the above 
problem gives ituu    and 
it
fixedxx ˆˆ  . 
 
Step 2: Fix the values of the complicating variables x̂ , and then solve the following 
subproblem as in the standard Benders decomposition method. 

















                                                 (3.14) 
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 Further suggestions are available to achieve this upper bound in (Conejo et al., 2006). For Algorithm 
3.1, a good value of the upper bound can be achieved by maximizing (as opposed to minimizing) the 
objective function in (3.6) over the entire space of decision and uncertainty variables. This is a definite 






Step 3: Check for convergence. Set wzsub   and
it
umasz  . If the difference 
  tolzzz submassub  /  then stop.  
 
Step 4: Add a Benders cut to the master problem (3.13).   
                                            




























                             (3.15) 
                        
Return to Step 2 and proceed in this manner until convergence is met.  
 
Theorem 3.4: If at the final iteration 0itsol  for every element of 
it
sol , 
Algorithm 3.1 converges to a globally optimal robust solution x* of (3.6) and 
worst-case uncertainty value *x̂  in a finite number of steps. 
Proof: By the theory of Benders decomposition for linear programs (Benders, 1962), 
Algorithm 3.1 converges to a maximum value for u  in a finite number of steps. The 
algorithm also provides x* and *x̂  such that *)(*)ˆ( xfxu  . If at the final iteration 
0itsol  for each element, then the function u  approximated by the Benders cuts 





Lemma 3.3, u  has a unique maximum point at *x̂ . By Theorem 3.2, *x̂  is a worst-
case uncertainty value, and fixing that value in (3.9) gives a globally optimal robust 
solution to (3.6).■ 
 
 Note that if at the final iteration a cut is added where  0solit , then Algorithm 
3.1 need not necessarily converge to a globally optimal robust solution because 
Theorem 3.2 requires this maximum point to be unique. If 0solit  at the final 
iteration, then there can be several points that maximize u , not all necessarily a 
worst-case uncertainty value. Algorithm 3.1 could then converge to a point that was 
not a robust point. In that case, the use of heuristic Algorithm 3.3 is needed. 
3.3.2. Formulation of Approach: Solving Robust Optimization Problems 
with Quasiconvex Constraints 
For convergence of the Benders decomposition algorithm, the function αu needs to be 
concave. There is a larger class of functions than simply linear programs for which 
these conditions are valid. Indeed, for many engineering applications as well as 
numerical examples, local concavity of αu can be sufficient (Conejo et al., 2006).  
 However, due to the worst-case analysis performed, αu is quasiconvex as 
given by Corollary 3.1. Unfortunately standard Benders cuts cannot be used to 
approximate quasiconvex functions (Conejo et al., 2006). The reason is that optimal 
solutions may be omitted when cuts are added. Our advantage in a robust 
optimization setting with quasiconvex constraints as in problem (3.11) is that we only 





function αu are not needed in between the endpoints, as the function attains its 
maximum at the endpoints. Figure 3.2 shows the idea behind these new cuts. The 
very top horizontal cut (labeled as “Cut 0”) is an upper bound set for αu as would 
normally occur in Benders decomposition. The numbers next to the cuts show the 
order of the cuts made in the iterative process.  At iteration it a new modified Benders 





























               (3.16) 
This cut is one way to approximate the function around the endpoints and see which 











)( x  
 
)( x  
 
 
Figure 3.2: The Robust Benders Cuts
16
 to Estimate the Maximum Endpoint of αu 
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The following Algorithm 3.2 describes the method for quasiconvex constraints. 
Algorithm 3.2 differs from Algorithm 3.1 in that the modified Benders cuts described 
above are used.  
 
Algorithm 3.2 (Heuristic Algorithm for Robust Optimization Problems with 
Quasiconvex Constraint Functions): 
 
Step 0: Set iteration counter (it) to 0. Pick a small positive constant for tolerance (tol). 
 






















                                  (3.17) 
The bounds on 
u  are user-defined depending on the problem. A good value is an 
optimal objective function value for the non-robust nominal problem. Solving the 
above problem gives ituu    and 
it
fixedxx ˆˆ  . 
 
Step 2: Fix the values of the complicating variables x̂ , and then solve the following 























                                                 (3.18) 
 
Step 3: Check for convergence. Set wzsub   and
it
umasz  . If the difference 
  tolzzz submassub  /  then stop.  
 
 Step 4: Add a modified Benders cut to the master problem. If this is any iteration 
greater than one, do not add an additional cut but just update the previous cut.  To 
problem (3.17), add the modified Benders cut (3.16).   
                                            
























































                        
Return to Step 2 and proceed in this manner until convergence is met.  
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 Note, for the first iteration take 
sol






3.3.3. Formulation of Approach: Solving Robust Optimization Problems 
with Nonlinear Constraints 
To extend the modified Benders decomposition method to general nonlinear 
constraints, the strategy will be to partition uncertainty intervals for uncertainty 
variables and attempt to find the interval-optimal points. Essentially, one can think of 
this as attempting to check the robustness of a candidate solution by partitioning the 
uncertainty interval by points and checking feasibility at each point. Clearly, if all 
constraints are feasible when fixed with the interval-optimal values for uncertainty 
elements, then the candidate solution is robust. Partitions can be selected depending 
on which type of constraint functions have uncertainty. In particular, quasiconvex 
constraint functions are simplest to consider.  
 Hence, under uncertainty in x, the maximum value of the function g lies on 
one of the endpoints of uncertainty when g is quasiconvex. So finding the interval-
optimal point for quasiconvex constraint functions under uncertainty entails checking 
one of the two endpoints of uncertainty.  
 However, for nonlinear, not necessarily quasiconvex constraint functions, the 
interval-optimal values need not lie on the endpoints. For this, the constraint functions 
in the uncertainty interval range need to be checked at intermediary points to find the 
interval-optimal points.  Figure 3.3 shows how checking further points helps. For 
quasiconvex constraint functions, Figure 3.3(a), only the endpoints need to be 
checked. For general nonlinear constraints, however, problems might be encountered 





Figure 3.3(b) where the method fails if enough points are not selected. Since 
quadratic constraints are symmetric, for concave quadratic constraints in particular 
(that are not quasiconvex) checking three points (endpoints plus central point of 
uncertainty interval, where 0ˆ x ) is enough to guarantee a robust solution (in general 
true for all symmetric concave constraints), Figure 3.3(c).  Selecting more points, 
Figure 3.3(d), solves this problem. Points maybe selected according to the accuracy 
desired for a locally optimal robust solution.   
 Checking additional points
18
 entails adding additional constraints that have 
different uncertainty variables  kkk xxx  ,ˆ , k = 1,…,K, with uncertainty ranges 
that are subsets of the original uncertainty ranges, i.e.    xxxx kk  ,,  for all 
k = 1,…,K. In particular, the modified Benders method considers a uniform 
distribution of these points to be checked with /kx x k    
, k = 1,…,K. To check for 
center points, the constraints with  Jjxg j ,..,1,0)0,(   need to be added. Note that 
this constraint is just the constraint gj without any consideration for uncertainty. Since 
0 is directly in the middle of the uncertainty interval, the constraint 
Jjxg j ,..,1,0)0,(   is simply the constraint with no uncertainty. 
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 Usually the number of additional points to be checked depends on the type of constraint functions as 
well as the accuracy desired. A good baseline for nonlinear constraint functions is to uniformly 
partition the uncertainty interval into enough additional points so that the distance between any two 

























Figure 3.3: Checking Feasibility by Interval-Optimal Points for Constraints: (a) 
Quasiconvex: Successful Check by Endpoints; (b) Non-convex: Failed Check due 
to Insufficient Number of Points; (c) Symmetric Concave: Successful Check by 
Middle Point and Endpoints; (d) Non-convex: Successful Check by Sufficient 
Number of Intermediary Points 
 
So, the formulation changes from (3.11) by adding further sample points (2K 
sample points). 


































                                 (3.20) 
)ˆ,( xxg  )ˆ,( xxg  







Here, kx , k = 1,…, K are the different sample points for the uncertainty interval as 
described by the black dots in Figure 3.3. Note that xxk 0 . The uncertainty 
elements (with a superscript ^) only take on two values (per element of vector) each. 
Since all the extra constraints from (3.20) when compared to (3.11) can be 
incorporated into the constraints in (3.11), from now on the rest of this chapter will 
assume that (3.11) has had a thorough sample of points such that within each interval 
of uncertainty, the constraint functions are quasiconvex.  
 To speed up computation of the proposed approach, gradient-based 
optimization algorithms (Bazaraa et al., 1993) are used as opposed to population-
based optimization ones (such as Genetic Algorithms or Simulated Annealing) 
(Davis, 1987). In particular, the nonlinear solvers CONOPT in GAMS (GAMS, 2010) 
which are gradient-based were used for all test problems except the last one on heat 
exchanger design. Since the code for the heat exchanger design problem was already 
available and coded in MATLAB, fmincon (MATLAB, 2008) was used for that 
particular problem. 
 The following describes the modified Benders decomposition algorithm where 
the constraint functions are quasiconvex within each interval of uncertainty. 
 
Algorithm 3.3 (Heuristic Algorithm for Robust Optimization Problems with 
Nonlinear Constraint Functions): 
 


























itit , add more
19
 sample points in  
(3.20) by making a uniform partition. Return to Step 0. 
 
 Note that, theoretically, convergence is not guaranteed in Algorithm 3.3. But 
the numerical results suggest that Algorithm 3.3 is applicable to a wide variety of 
problems.  Now some computational costs based on numerical evidence will be 
provided. Consider a single-objective, robust optimization problem with V variables, 
J constraints, P parameters, and N uncertainty variables. One function call
20
 is defined 
as any instance where the solver calls an objective function, constraint, or other value 
or assignment in the optimization problem. Table 3.1 gives the maximum number of 
function calls possible through one iteration of the modified Benders method. This 
analysis is only based on numerical evidence that the method finds a locally optimal 
robust solution through Algorithm 3.3. 
   
  
                                                 
 
19
 In practice, double the number of points as was done for the numerical examples in this dissertation. 
20
 Due to difference in software, the GAMS method of function calls was used. Therefore, function 
calls for both deterministic and robust cases are provided so the reader can compare solutions. 






Table 3.1: Analysis of function calls for one iteration 
Operation Number of  
Assignments 
Function Calls 
Objective Function 1 1 
Iteration Counter 1 1 
Constraints J+1  
(Extra 1 for obj. robust) 
N(J+1) 
Fixing Uncertainty  
at Lower Level 
N N 
Slope of Modified  
Benders Cut 
N N(J+1) 
Sample Points for Nonlinear  2K 2KN + 4KN-2N 
Total Maximum Expected - 2 + N + JN + 6KN 
 
 For most of the numerical problems in this chapter, K is at most 10. Hence, 
the number of binary variables introduced to the formulation is NJK. Note that this is 
the maximum theoretically possible function calls and actual function calls (as shown 
by examples) are much less. For example, in the heat exchanger problem (Section 
3.5.3), N = 8, J = 17, K = 10 and 6 iterations were used to solve the problem so the 
maximum expected number of function calls is 6(2 + 8 + (17)(8) + 6(10)(8)) = 3,756. 






3.4. Numerical Results 
The following numerical and engineering examples serve to demonstrate applicability 
of the algorithm, compare the proposed algorithm to a previous algorithm from the 
literature, and show the different types of problems that can be solved. The first 
example is a simple quadratic program to show the algorithm steps in detail. The next 
three examples then increase the complexity (number of variables, nonlinearity) of 
this quadratic program and show how the number of function calls changes. The next 
two examples are similar linear programs except that Example 6 has been shown to 
need a significantly higher number of function calls to solve for the locally robust 
optimal solution than Example 5 (Li et al., 2011). Examples 7 and 8 are robust 
optimization problems with quasiconvex constraints which the modified Benders 
method is shown to solve exactly. The next four problems are scalable versions of an 
engineering example with quasiconvex constraints. These examples show that the 
modified Benders method is scalable and can be applied to large problems without a 
drastic increase in function calls. The final two examples are from engineering design 
and are nonlinear (non-convex) programs. Of the two engineering examples, the first 
one (Welded Beam Design) considers objective robustness and the second (Heat 
Exchanger Design) considers feasibility robustness.  All optimization problems 
correspond to minimizing a single objective function with a set of constraints. 
Problems labeled as “self” have been designed by the author to use as test problems 
(Siddiqui et al., 2011a); detailed formulations as well as further characteristics of the 
solution are in Appendix A. Solutions were checked by a simple uniform 





the constraints were violated under uncertainty.  Tolerance (tol) was set to 0.00001 
for all examples. 
3.4.1. Numerical Example (Example 1) to Show Methodology Step-by-
Step 
A simple numerical example is presented to show how Benders algorithm is modified 
to obtain robust solutions using heuristic Algorithm 3.2. In the following robust 
problem, uncertainty is only in the constraint (without loss of generality). 
                             



























                                               (3.21) 
The robust solution to this problem (verified as unique algebraically) is 
45.0,45.0 21  xx with the globally interval-optimal value 1.0ˆ x . Since the 
constraint functions are linear, hence quasiconvex within the uncertainty interval, 
reformulate as in (3.11) to have uncertainty variables only have endpoint values. 
                             



























                                               (3.22) 






Step 1: The master problem is the following: 












                                                                             (3.23) 
The upper bound on   is chosen to be large enough to not interfere with given the 
form of (3.22). Solving the above problem gives 1000  and x̂  = -0.1.  Here 



























                                        (3.24) 
 
Step 2: Fix x̂  and then solve the following subproblem:  
                               


























                                       (3.25)
 
This gives: .55.0,55.0 21  xx  
 
Step 3: Check for convergence with 995.999005.01000  lowup zz  where 





convergence when compared with the preselected tolerance, a modified (robust) 
Benders cut is added.  
 
Step 4: Add the following robust Benders cut. 







                                
(3.26) 
 
Step 1 (returned): Solve the following master problem after adding the robust Benders 
cut: 























                                (3.27)
 
Solving the above problem gives 1000  and x̂  = 0.1.  Then go back to Step 2 and 
solve the subproblem with x̂  = 0.1 fixed. A new modified Benders cut will now be 
added. 
 
 The following graph (Figure 3.4) shows what happens when this cut is added. 
The standard Benders decomposition method would have taken a cut that would have 
forced x̂  = -0.1 and that would have given the constraint with the dashed line. 
However, the robust Benders cut generates the cut signified by the dotted line, which 






Figure 3.4: Adding a modified (Robust) Benders Cut 
 
 
The algorithm proceeds in this manner until convergence. Table 3.2 summarizes these 
results. 
 
Table 3.2: Solution Steps for Modified Benders Approach 
Iteration x̂   x1 x2 zlow zup 
1 -0.1 0.55 0.55 0.005 1000 
2 0.1 0.45 0.45 0.045 1000 






This simple problem was solved in three iterations. The final row corresponds 
to the globally-optimal robust solution, which can be verified algebraically to be 
globally robust optimal. The details are shown in the following table (Table 3.3). 
 
Table 3.3: Detailed Solution for Simple Problem 
Information Nominal Solution Robust Solution 
x1 0.5 0.45 
x2 0.5 0.45 
f (x) 0.02 0.045 
Function Calls 5 11 
 
 
3.4.2. Numerical Results 
Table 3.4 describes the results obtained from the numerical test problems. The first 
two examples have only uncertainty in the parameters while the rest have uncertainty 
in the parameters and the decision variables.  
The same test problems were solved using Li et al.‟s (Li et al., 2006) method 
for robust optimization and the results are displayed in Table 3.4. Not only does Li et 
al.‟s (Li et al., 2006) method use a lot of function calls, but often the robust function 
value is higher than the modified Benders value. Once the number of function calls 
exceeded 10
9
, the run was stopped. These solutions have not been reported in Table 
3.4 as well as in the rest of the chapter as they were infeasible in the solver (which 
































0.02 0.045 0.045 5 11 540 
Example 2 
(Self) 
9.02 9.145 9.268 7 19 2,592 
Example 3 
(Self) 
9.02 9.145 9.268 7 21 2,808 
Example 4 
(Self) 





-23.00 -21.50 -20.75 5 17 7,856 
Example 6 
(Self) 


















3.5. Engineering Design and Other Applications 
3.5.1. Fleury’s Weight Minimization 
This is a modified example from the literature (Groenwold & Etman, 2010) so that 
interval uncertainty is present in all the decision variables. This example supports the 
approach for feasibility robustness as well as corroborates the fact that the modified 
Benders method is able to tackle problems with large number of variables and 
constraints without being computationally expensive. For N variables, the problem is 
as follows: 



































































                        (3.28) 
 The modified Benders method solved this problem with the results shown in 








. Note that the number of function calls 
increases linearly with the complexity of the problem. N represents the number of 
variables in the problem and all of them have uncertainty. Again, this example was 
compared to (Li et al., 2006) as shown in Table 3.5. However, the results for (Li et 
al., 2006) are not reported as the problem was stopped after a certain number of 
function calls given in Table 3.5. Here, Li et al.‟s (Li et al., 2006) method could, 





However, the modified Benders method solved all cases and produced only a linear 
increase in computational effort.  
Table 3.5: Results for Fleury’s Weight Minimization Like Problem 




 N = 10
4












x1 to x0.95N (Determ.) 1 1 1 1 
x1 to x0.95N (Robust) 1.1556 1.1556 1.1556 1.1556 


















Function Value (Determ.) 95.00005 950.0005 9500.005 95000.05 
Function Value (Robust) 110.2820 1102.820 11028.20 110282.0 
Function Calls (Determ.) 506 2.0 × 10
3
 2.0 × 10
4
 2.0 × 10
5
 
Function Calls (Robust) 744 2.3 × 10
4
 1.9 × 10
5
 1.9 × 10
6
 
Fn. Calls (Li et al., 2006) >10
9 >109 >1012 >1012 
 
 
3.5.2. Design of a Welded Beam 
This example is a well-known welded beam problem from (Ragsdell & Phillips, 
1976).  In this problem, a beam A is to be welded to a rigid support member B. The 
beam has a rectangular cross-section and is to be made out of steel. The beam is 
designed to support a force F = 6000 LBF acting at the tip of the beam, and there are 
constraints on the shear stress, normal stress, deflection, and buckling load on the 
beam. The problem has four continuous design variables, and they are: thickness of 





(b). All variables are in inches. The objective of the problem is to minimize the total 
cost f(x) of making such an assembly.  For complete formulation of the robust 
optimization problem including specific values of the parameters, please refer to 
(Gunawan & Azarm, 2004). Figure 3.5 shows the structure of the beam. 
 
Figure 3.5: Design of a Welded Beam (Gunawan & Azarm, 2004) 
The following is the formulation for the welded beam as outlined in (Gunawan & 
Azarm, 2004). The objective function is given by 
)()1(min 4
2
3cost lLtbclhcf                                         (3.29) 







c3 = cost of weld material ($0.1047/inch
3
) 
c4 = cost of weld material ($0.0481/inch
3
) 
η = maximum shear stress in weld (psi) 
ηd = allowable shear stress in weld (13,600 psi) 
ζ = maximum normal stress in beam (psi) 
ζd = allowable normal stress in beam (30,000 psi) 
δ = deflection at beam end (inch) 
Pc = allowable buckling load (LBF) 
L = Length of unwelded beam (14 inch) 
G = 12 × 10
6
 psi 
E = 30 × 10
6
 psi 
The following equations are used to calculate the above variables. 
22 )''(cos'''2)'(  
                                                  (3.30)
 
    
  
  25 . 0 , 0 ~ 
1547 . 0 , 0547 . 0 ~ 
0 . 2 1 . 0 0 . 2 1 . 0 
0 . 2 1 . 0 0 . 2 1 . 0 
0 1 
125 . 0 
0 1 
0 1 0 1 
25 . 0 
0 1 0 1 
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                                                                (3.36)
 
 The solution from the modified Benders method is different from (Gunawan 
& Azarm, 2004). First, the modified Benders method‟s nominal solution is closer to 
an actual solution from an earlier paper by (Ragsdell & Phillips, 1976) who provided 
an optimal objective function value  of  f = 2.38 while (Gunawan & Azarm, 2004) 
provided  f = 2.39. Second, the robust solution is also lower in function value but still 
feasible. The robust solution is also feasible for all realizations of uncertainty, hence 
it is better than (Gunawan & Azarm, 2004) reported solution.  
 This example highlights the strength of the modified Benders method over 
previous methods. Gunawan and Azarm‟s (Gunawan & Azarm, 2004) method 
involves a backward mapping approach, which is known to omit solutions. The 
modified Benders method, while giving a better solution (lower in function value), is 





was checked for robustness using a genetic algorithm. The solution is displayed in 
Table 3.6. 
Table 3.6: Results of Welded Beam Example 












h 0.241 0.2444 0.246 0.2392 
l 6.158 6.2186 5.461 5.6753 
t 8.5 8.2915 9.138 9.1225 
b 0.243 0.2444 0.248 0.2392 
f(x) 2.39 2.3807 2.48 2.4236 
Function 
Calls 
N/A 8 250 38 
 
3.5.3. Heat Exchanger Design 
The energy balance on a heat exchanger can be written as 
)()()()( 1221 cccphhhpm TTmcTTmcTUAFQ               (3.37) 
Several equations govern the above heat transfer. The above equation (3.37) will be 
used as an objective function that is to be maximized, as well as constraints that 
restrict the structure, in particular constraints on the pressure drop on the tube side 
( tp ) and shell side ( sp ). Subscript 1 denotes the fluid entering while subscript 2 





water is in the tubes and hot water is on the shell side and the problem has been set up 
in a counterflow arrangement for a 124 tubes and two-pass heat exchanger. The 
following lists the important variables and parameters considered in this design. 
 
Symbol Units Description Value 
cp J/(kg K) Specific heat at constant pressure Variable 
d0 m Tube outside diameter Variable 
f  Tube flow friction factor Variable 
fs  Friction factor shell side Variable 
h0 W/(m
2
 K) Heat-transfer coefficient outside tube Variable 
hi W/(m
2
 K) Heat-transfer coefficient inside tube Variable 
k W/(m K) Thermal conductivity of fluids Variable 
Δps Pa Shell-side pressure drop Variable 
Δpt Pa Tube-side pressure drop Variable 
ut M/s Mean axial velocity of fluid in tube  Variable 
A0 m
2 
Tube outside surface area per pass Variable 
Ai m
2
 Tube inside surface  Variable 
As m
2
 Cross-flow area at or near shell centerline Variable 
At m
2
 Total cross-sectional area of tubes per pass Variable 
B m Baffle spacing 0.5 
C m Clearance between adjacent tubes Variable 
CL  Tube layout constant 1 (for 90
0
) 
CTP  Tube count calculation constant 0.90 
De m Equivalent diameter of shell Variable 
F  LMTD correction factor  Variable 
L m Tube length Variable 
Nb  Number of Baffles (Integer = B/L) 4 
NT  Number of Tubes 124 
Np  Number of Tube passes 2 
PP W Pumping power of fluid in tubes Variable 
Pr  Prandtl Number Variable 
Q W Heat-transfer rate Variable 
Rfo (m
2
 K)/W Fouling resistance on outside of tube 0.00015 
Rfi (m
2
 K)/W Fouling resistance on inside of tube 0.00015 
Reb  Reynolds number at Tb Variable 
Res  Shell-side Reynolds number at Tb Variable 
ΔTm K LMTD Variable 
Th2 K Outlet temperature of hot fluid Variable 
Tc2 K Outlet temperature of cold fluid 315 
Tb K Bulk temperature Variable 
Tw K Wall temperature Variable 
U W/(m
2
 K) Average overall heat transfer coefficient based on A Variable 
θs  Viscosity correction factor Variable 
μ kg/(s m) Dynamic Viscosity Variable 
μb kg/(s m) Dynamic Viscosity at Tb Variable 











The following equations are the ones coded into MATLAB and are selected from the 
whole formulation to provide further insight. For the complete formulation and all 
equations used, please refer to (Magrab et al., 2004). 
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                                                      (3.40) 
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Table 3.7: Design Variables and Parameters with Uncertainty 
Symbol Unit Description Uncertainty 
di m Tube inside diameter (Variable) di  ±  0.001 
mt kg/s Tube-side mass flow rate (Variable) mt  ±  1 
ms kg/s Shell-side mass flow rate (Variable) ms  ± 1 
Ds m Shell inside diameter (Variable) Ds  ±  0.01 
PT m Pitch size (Variable) PT  ±  0.01 
Th1 K Inlet temperature of hot fluid 65 ±  1 
Tc1 K Inlet temperature of cold fluid 18 ±  1 
ktube W/(m K) Thermal conductivity of tubes 60 ±  1 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Heat Exchanger Schematic (Magrab et al., 2004) 
   






























































                                                         (3.44) 
The following table shows the results. 
 
Table 3.8: Results for Heat Exchanger Design 
Variables Nominal Solution Robust Solution 
Q 1006.77 906.09 
di 0.0160 0.0149 
mt 10 9 
ms 14 14 
Ds 0.3900 0.3900 
PT 0.0240 0.0311 
Function Calls 49 984 
 
 The thing to note about this example is that with less than an average of 1% 
uncertainty, the objective function value decreases by almost 10%. Hence, in the 





can lead to different designs as well. This problem was also tried with Li et al.‟s 
(2006) method however after 10
9
 function calls without convergence, the approach 
was stopped. 
 For completeness, Table 3.9 displays actual computational time for each test 
problem as well. 
Table 3.9: Number of Iterations and CPU Time to Solve Problems 
Test  
Problem 
Number of  
Iterations 
CPU (2.0 GHz, 4GB RAM)  
Time (s) 
Example 1 3 0.560 
Example 2 3 0.787 
Example 3 3 1.654 
Example 4 3 1.435 
Example 5 3 3.821 
Example 6 3 3.494 
Hock 100 4 30.552 
Hock 106 4 25.645 
Fleury (N=10
2
) 6 9.328 
Fleury (N=10
3
)  9 324.532 
Fleury (N=10
4
) 12 886.321 
Fleury (N=10
5
) 15 2123.453 
Welded Beam 4 1.606 






3.5.4. Building Energy Intensive Infrastructure 
This example takes a problem of a decision maker to decide whether to build energy 
intensive infrastructure at intensity H when there is uncertainty in future carbon tax 
and retrofit cost. This example is a modified version of the formulation from the 
paper (Strand et al., 2011). Investments in large, long-lasting, energy-intensive 
infrastructure that use fossil fuels increase longer-term energy use and greenhouse gas 
emissions, unless the plant is shut down early or undergoes costly retrofit later. These 
investments will depend on expectations of retrofit costs and future energy costs, 
including energy cost increases from tighter controls on carbon emissions.  
 Consider a decision maker in a world with two periods. Infrastructure 
investment is made at the start of period 1, and can be “retrofitted” at the start of 
period 2.
 
As long as it is operated and not retrofitted, a given infrastructure gives rise 
to a given energy consumption per unit of time, determined at the time of initial 
investment. Energy supply costs and environmental/climate-related costs are 
uncertain at the time of establishment in period 1, but are revealed at the start of 
period 2. Assume both periods have the same length, and there is no discounting 























                 (3.45) 
 Here, U(H) is the utility of the decision maker when selecting an energy 





energy are t1 and in the second period are t2. The ratio α is the amount of energy 
investment that is retrofitted, and r is the cost of that retrofit. In (3.45), the decision 
maker aims to maximize utility in the two periods (without any discounting). 
 As in (Strand et al., 2011), the uncertainty is present in the values of t2 and r. 
The last constraint in the above formulation makes sure that the cost for retrofitting 
and paying carbon tax in the second period is below the excess utility achieved in the 
first period. For the numerical study, the following parameters were chosen. 
 U(H) = 8H – H2 
 Hmax = 4 
 t1 = 1 
  222 4,4 ttt   
  5.6,5.5r  
 Note that in this first case, we have assumed that t2 has uncertainty of 
magnitude Δ t2 while uncertainty in retrofit cost r is given as above. The goal is to see 
what happens as this uncertainty range is increased. The robust optimization problem 






































The modified Benders method is applied to solve this problem. Table 3.10 shows 
what happens to energy intensity H and selection of retrofit vs. not retrofit as Δt2 
increases. 
Table 3.10: Results for Increasing Uncertainty in t2 
Value of Δt2 Energy Intensity (H) Retrofit? (Value of α) 
0 3 No (α = 0) 
1 2 No (α = 0) 
2 1 No (α = 0) 
3 0.5 Yes (α = 1) 
4 0.5 Yes (α = 1) 
 
 Note that with increasing uncertainty, the decision maker chooses less energy 
intensive infrastructure. This is at odds with the probability-based analysis done in 
(Strand et al., 2011). Since (Strand et al., 2011) assumed probability distributions for 
t2 and r, an increase in uncertainty meant a good chance that t2 would offer a low tax 
in the future as well. Hence, an increase in uncertainty brought an increase in energy 
intensive investment. One of the main reasons this answer is different is that robust 
optimization considers a worst-case analysis. Hence, with increasing uncertainty, the 
extremely risk-averse robust optimizer chooses a progressively safer option, to avoid 
any chance of not being able to afford retrofit or tax in the future. Hence, robust 






This chapter presents an efficient robust optimization approach to solve problems that 
have parameters and/or decision variables with interval uncertainty. The proposed 
modified Benders method obtains robust optimal solutions to linear programming, 
quadratic programming, convex and non-convex programming problems. The 
approach is computationally tractable and is tested with 14 numerical and engineering 
examples with the most general being nonlinear (non-convex) objective function and 
nonlinear (non-convex) constraint robust optimization problems. The modified 
Benders method provides an approximate locally optimal robust solution to general 
nonlinear robust optimization problems, with a way to improve this approximation if 
desired.  
 The test examples show the strength of this method when compared to two 
previous approaches. Not only is the method computationally efficient, but also 
obtains better solutions when compared to these previous methods. The method is 
scalable, that is, number of function calls increases at most linearly with an increase 








Chapter 4: Solving Mathematical Programs and 
Equilibrium Programs with Equilibrium Constraints 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter describes a new algorithm to solve mathematical programs and 
equilibrium programs with equilibrium constraints. Numerical examples are provided 
in each case, along with a test of computational time with disjunctive constraints. An 
application of the method to a large-scale North American gas market model is also 
provided.  
 The motivation behind developing an algorithm for MPECs was to find an 
alternative to traditional techniques, in particular disjunctive constraints. This was 
necessitated by the need to solve large-scale MPECs representing natural gas markets. 
A North American gas model was developed from the larger World Gas Model  
(Gabriel et al., 2011c). Various techniques
21
 were employed to solve this North 
American gas model, but the only successful one was the application of Algorithm 
4.1 presented later in this chapter.  
 Hence, for this research thrust, the application drove the theory. In this 
chapter, the current state of the theory is presented. As these ideas are still being 
                                                 
 
21
 The fine tuning of solvers was needed to be able to solve the North American gas model. In 
particular, the SBB solver (GAMS, 2010) was used in conjunction with CONOPT (GAMS, 2010). The 
iteration limits for the first search of SBB needed to be increased. For particular sections of the branch 





developed, there is great room for further development, including the EPEC solution 
techniques. 
 The chapter starts with a general theory of the new MPEC and EPEC 
technique followed by examples. Finally, an application of the technique is presented 
for the North American gas market model. A portion of this chapter has been 
presented in (Siddiqui & Gabriel, 2011b) and (Gabriel et al., 2011c). 
4.2. Solving Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Constraints  
4.2.1. Changing the Formulation of the Lower-Level Problem 
Recall that approximating 
0),( yxgyT                                                                         (4.1) 
was one of the hurdles in solving MPECs. If g is a linear term, approximating the left-
hand side of (4.1) often involves specialized techniques, one of which happens to be 
Schur‟s decomposition followed with an approximation by linear functions (Gabriel 
et al., 2006). Moreover, results in this dissertation corroborate this fact by using the 
same idea for a vector-valued linear function g if linear constraints are included. First, 
using Schur‟s decomposition, vectors u and v (dependent on x and y) are used to 

































                                                                      (4.2) 
Now, the optimization problem does not contain any bilinear terms. In fact 
0 vvuu TT                                                                         (4.3) 
can be readily approximated using SOS type 2 (Beale, 1975)
22
 variables to create a 
piecewise-linear function. However, realizing that the complementarity conditions 
force 0y  and 0),( yxg , shows that only the positive square root of u
2
 will give a 



























                                                                       (4.4)
 
The next theorem shows that the solution sets to (2.5), (2.16), and (4.4) are the same. 
 
                                                 
 
22
 Special ordered sets of type 2 (SOS type 2) variables are defined as a set of positive variables of 





Theorem 4.1. Let the solution set to formulation (2.5) be given by S1, the solution 
set to formulation (2.16) be given by S2 and the solution set to formulation (4.4) 
be given by S3. Then, given a large enough value
23
 of K, S1 = S2 = S3. 
Proof. Realize that all three formulations (2.5), (2.16), and (4.4) have the same 
objective function. Hence, it is sufficient to show that all three formulations have the 
same feasible region. Hence, assume that S1, S2, S3 represent the feasible regions of 
formulation (2.5), (2.16), and (4.4), respectively. We will show these feasible regions 
are equivalent by showing 1321 SSSS  . The subscript i will denote vector 
element computation.  
 Pick a point 1
11 ),( Syx  . We want to show that there exists a value of r such 
that 2
11 ),( Syx  . Then, for all i, either 01 iy , or 0),(
11 yxgi  or both. Suppose 
01 iy . Then, in formulation (2.16), let ri = 1, which implies 0
1 iy  in formulation 
(2.16) as well. If 0),( 11 yxgi , then choose ri = 0, which implies 0),(
11 yxgi in 
formulation (2.16) as well. If both are zero, choose ri = 1 (or ri = 0), which will ensure 
that 01 iy and that 0),(
11 yxgi is within the feasible region of (2.16). Since K is 
chosen to be large enough, these arguments imply that the solution set to (2.5) is 
contained in the solution set to (2.16), i.e., 21 SS  .  
 Next, pick   ynSryx 1,0),,( 2
222  which is a solution to (2.16). Consider any 
vector element i. Suppose that 02 ir . This implies 0),(
22 yxgi , which implies 
                                                 
 
23
















v  . Hence, this implies 022  ii vu , and in particular 0
22  ii vu . 
On the other hand, 12 ir implies 0
2 iy , 
2
),( 222 yxgu ii  , and 
2
),( 222 yxgv ii  . 
Hence, this case also implies that 022  ii vu . Therefore, 3
22 ),( Syx   and 32 SS  . 
 Now pick any solution 3
33 ),( Syx  . For this solution 033  ii vu for each i. 
Hence, this implies     02323  ii vu  and, in particular     0
2323
 ii vu . Then, the 
following argument shows that 13 SS  . 
   




























Hence, S1, S2, and S3 are subsets of each other so they are equivalent.■ 
 
4.2.2. Approximating The Absolute Value Function Using Special 
Ordered Sets of Type 1 Variables 
The previous proof shows that using the absolute value function can be a substitute 
for using disjunctive constraints. However, the absolute value function is also a 
nonlinear function which can provide computational difficulty to optimization solvers 





 The absolute value can be reformulated as in (4.5) using Special ordered sets 
of type 1 (SOS1) variables (Beale & Tomlin, 1970). SOS1 variables are defined as 
sets of non-negative variables of which at most one can be non-zero.  
                                
































                                            (4.5) 
 
Lemma 4.1. Let S4 be the solution set to (4.5). The solution sets to formulation 
(4.5) and formulation (4.4), S4 and S3 respectively, are equivalent. That is, S4 = 
S3. 
Proof. Again, since the objective functions for both formulations are the same, it is 
sufficient to show that both formulations have the same feasible region. Hence, 
assume that S4 and S3 represent the feasible regions of formulation (4.5) and (4.4), 
respectively. Set vvv   . Then, for all i, either   0 iv , or   0 iv  or both 
because    ii vv  ,  is a set of SOS1 variables where at most one can be nonzero. This 
implies that vvv    (componentwise absolute value). Hence, we can substitute v 
in for  vv  in formulation (9) and v   for   vv  in formulation (4.5) to get 






4.2.3. Approximating Absolute Value Function Using a Penalty Method 
The SOS1 approach at times can numerically fail for more complex problems, as 
SOS1 variables also require binary variables to be formulated within the solver 
(GAMS, 2010). For example, the North American Gas model could not be solved 
using the SOS1 formulation and instead required a better starting point as described 
in Section 4.4. The North American Gas model was eventually solved using 
Algorithm 4.1 described in Section 4.2.4. Several other alternatives were explored to 
approximate this absolute value function. In particular, Steffensen and Ulbrich 
(Steffensen & Ulbrich, 2010) provide a smooth function approximation to the 
absolute value function. However, their methodology did not work when applied to 
the example (U.S. version of the World Gas Model (Gabriel et al., 2011c)) in this 
chapter. An alternative way to approximate the absolute value function is the penalty 
method (Bazaraa et al., 1993), which works well for finding solutions to MPECs.   







































                                         (4.6)
 
 
Theorem 4.2. Assume that the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are both 










nonzero in formulation (4.6).  
 
Proof. We will show this by contradiction. Suppose that there exists a Li > 0 such that 
a solution to (4.6) gives an index i where both   0 iv   and   0 iv . Let the 
following be the slightly altered form of (4.6) considered where the Lagrange 
multipliers are included in parentheses and {(x, y) s.t. C(x, y) < 0} defines the set of 
constraints that define Ω.  



















































                                    (4.7) 
 Then, taking the first-order Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions (Bazaraa et al., 
1993), respectively, for  iv  and  iv  gives     054  iiiL   and 
    054  iiiL   since both   0

iv   and   0 iv . Together these two 
conditions imply   05 i  and  iiL 4 . This implies that the Lagrangian (Λ) can 



















































 Realizing that 4  now appears in two terms, we can factor this out and realize 
that the following optimization problem will give the same solution as formulation 
(4.7) above.  






































































                          (4.8) 
But since Li > 0, this implies   04 i  and since the above formulation satisfies 
necessary and sufficient
24
 conditions for the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, 




 yxgy ii . Since both y and g are constrained 
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 Necessary conditions are needed to go from formulation (4.7) to the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions 
and sufficient conditions to go from Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions of (4.7) to optimization 
formulation (4.8). Also, it can be argued that the constraint associated with  
i4
  need not be an 






to be nonzero, this implies that     0  ii vv  for the index i in (4.7). This is a 
contradiction. Hence, for all Li > 0, the formulation (4.6) gives a solution where for 




)i is nonzero.■ 
  
 From this point on, L = max{Li} will be the constant for each variation of 
(4.6). The value of the constant L should be chosen to be small enough so it does not 
interfere with the solution. It is not known at this time if there always exists a value of 
L for which an exact solution is achieved but numerical results suggest there are 
multiple values of L for which a solution to the MPEC can be obtained. By Theorem 
4.2 for all positive L, (4.6) provides a solution that is always a feasible solution to 
(4.5) but not necessarily optimal for large values of L. Therefore, L can be chosen to 
be machine epsilon
25
. Numerical results validate that as L approaches zero, the 
optimal objective function value of (4.6) approaches the optimal objective function 
value of (2.5). At times, solvers will fail to solve MPECs by finding an infeasible 




)i are nonzero. An 
alternative to this is provided by the following (heuristic) Algorithm 1.  
4.2.4. Algorithm 4.1 to Solve Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium 
Constraints 
 
Step 0: Pick a tolerance t. 
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Step 1: Solve the problem using the penalty method formulation (4.6) with L 
 =t. 
 




 that are both non-zero. If 
 yes, go to Step 3.  If not, skip to Step 6. 
 
Step 3: Reformulate those particular variables as SOS1 variables as in 
 formulation (4.5). 
 
 Step 4: Solve the problem again using the solution from Step 1 as an initial 
  starting point. 
 
 Step 5: Go to Step 2. 
 
Step 6: Check solution by changing value of L in formulation. Decrease L  
 until value for objective function stays the same. Then stop. 
 
4.2.5. Numerical Results 
Consider the following sample MPEC where three firms compete to sell natural gas 
in the market. Assume linear demand and a quadratic cost function. This MPEC is 
modeled as a Stackelberg game (Gibbons, 1996), where the firms choose quantities to 





shale gas producing firm can exert market power in the North American natural gas 
market. This assumption can be interpreted in various ways. One way is that other 
players wait for the shale producing firm to make its production decision before 
deciding on their own production values. Another interpretation is that the shale 
producing firm can influence market dynamics so that the other players become 
reactionary. The Stackelberg leader, “Shale Firm,” has market power and gets to 






Table 4.1: Definition of terms for simple example 
Parameters Shale Firm Firm 1 Firm 2 
Intercept and Slope of Linear Demand a,b a,b a,b 
Marginal cost C c1 c2 
Positive Constants Used to Replace 
Complementarities by Disjunctive Constraints 
N/A K1 K2 
 
Variables Shale Firm Firm 1 Firm 2 
Quantity Natural Gas Sold
26
 Q q1 q2 
Binary Variables  Used to Replace 
Complementarities by Disjunctive Constraints 
N/A r1 r2 
 
Outputs Shale Firm Firm 1 Firm 2 
Market Price
27
 P P P 
Profits ProfitShale Profit1 Profit2 
  
 Shale Firm solves a constrained maximization problem where it maximizes its 
own profits. This is the upper-level problem: 






max                                                 (4.9) 
 
                                                 
 
26
 These quantities are constrained to be nonnegative.  
27





 The firms i = 1,2 at the lower-level solves the following  problem where they 
take quantity Q as given and try to maximize profits while in Nash-Cournot 
competition with  the other Stackelberg follower firm j. 






max                                     (4.10)          
 This lower-level Nash-Cournot game can be expressed as a (linear) 
complementarity problem
 









                          (4.11) 
 To solve the problem using disjunctive constraints, the KKT conditions are 
added to the constraint set in (4.9) to form one overall problem. By having 
sufficiently large positive constants K1 and K2, the complementarity problem (4.11) is 

















                           (4.12) 
where r1 are r2 are binary variables. Let K1 = K2 be the maximum of the x-intercept, y-
intercept of the demand function, and the capacity restrictions, i.e. K1 = K2 = max 
{a/b, a}. This provided a lower bound on K1 and K2 so that there isn‟t a computational 
error (Gabriel & Leuthold, 2010). 
 Finally, replacing the original complementarity problem with the disjunctive 
constraints and combining with the upper-level problem, the following mixed-integer 
































                             (4.13) 
 The goal is to use (4.13) as a benchmark for comparison to the proposed 
method. Using (4.9) to (4.11), the MPEC under consideration is reformulated to 


























                                          (4.14) 














 by Schur‟s 
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 The computational objective was to compare the results for the methods of 
disjunctive constraints (4.13), SOS1 variables (4.15) and the penalty method (4.16). 
This was accomplished using GAMS (GAMS, 2010) with CONOPT being used as 
the nonlinear solver and SBB the mixed integer nonlinear solver.  
 The capacity constraints for production quantities are omitted for this first 
example, i.e., maximum production is only limited by rising costs. The following 






Table 4.2: Different Datasets to Compare (4.13), (4.15), and (4.16) 
Dataset Parameters Dataset 1 Dataset 2 Dataset 3 
a 13 13 13 
b 1 0.1 0.1 
c1 = c2 = C 1 1 2 
 
 For the disjunctive constraints formulation (4.16), K1 = K2 = max {b/a , a} = 
13 consistent with (Gabriel & Leuthold, 2010) for all the datasets while for the 
penalty method approximation (4.16), two different values of L were chosen to show 
how a lower value of L gives a better answer as shown below in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3: Different Cases to Compare Solutions to (4.16) 
 Case 1 Case 2 
Value of L 0.0001 1 
 
 The following Tables 4.4-4.6 report the results. The true answer
28
 can be 
easily verified algebraically as unique and is shown in the third column of the tables. 
Note that disjunctive constraints obtained the correct answer for Dataset 1, implying 
that a correct value of K was chosen. 
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 It is simple algebra to show that this is the unique solution since there are no constraints and all 





Table 4.4: Results for Dataset 1 
Results Disj Cons True 
Answer 
SOS Case1 Case 2 
q1 = q2 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 1.833 
Q 6.000 6.000 6.000 6.000 6.500 
Price 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 2.833 
Profit shale 12.000 12.000 12.000 12.000 11.917 
Profit 1=2 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 3.361 
 
Table 4.5: Results for Dataset 2 
Results Disj Cons True 
Answer 
SOS Case1 Case 2 
q1 = q2 13.000 20.000 20.000 20.000 18.333 
Q 81.000 60.000 60.000 60.000 65.000 
Price 2.300 3.000 3.000 3.000 2.833 
Profit shale 105.300 120.000 120.000 120.000 119.167 











Table 4.6: Results for Dataset 3 
Results Disj Cons True 
Answer 
SOS Case1 Case 2 
q1 = q2 13.000 18.333 18.333 18.333 16.667 
Q 71.000 55.000 55.000 55.000 60.000 
Price 3.300 3.833 3.833 3.833 3.667 
Profit shale 92.300 100.833 100.833 100.833 100.00 
Profit 1=2 16.900 33.611 33.611 33.611 27.778 
 
 If the methodology to choose K as outlined in the literature (Gabriel & 
Leuthold, 2010) is used, disjunctive constraints do not provide the solutions in 
datasets 2 and 3
29
. These results point out a big weakness with disjunctive constraints 
that the solution can be very far from the true answer and the given solution can be 
extremely sensitive to the value of K if appropriate problem specific values are not 
selected. 
 Choosing the correct K can make the disjunctive constraint method (4.13) 
accurate. Choosing a correct L makes (4.16) accurate as well. The next set of 
numerical results were done with Dataset 3 with K =10000 and
30
 L = 10
-16
  where 
these values were reached after numerical and algebraic verification of the test 
problem. The test problem was changed so that now instead of two players at the 
                                                 
 
29
 The method in (Gabriel & Leuthold, 2010) gives a correct value of K whenever maximum 
production (capacity constraints for production) is included in the problem formulation. Our goal was 
to give a very simple counterexample where the disjunctive constraints approach didn‟t work. 
30





lower level, there were M players with similar costs and parameters. The number of 
players was increased to test the computation time taken for disjunctive constraints 
(4.13), SOS1 (4.15), and the penalty method (4.16). The results are shown in the 
following Figure 4.1. All methods were able to obtain the correct solutions. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Computational Time for Solving Problem 
 
 Clearly, the disjunctive constraint method becomes extremely computationally 
expensive when number of players is increased. Note that the graphs for the penalty 





4.3. Solving Equilibrium Programs with Equilibrium Constraints 
4.3.1. Extending Algorithm 4.1 to Equilibrium Programs with 
Equilibrium Constraints 
Note that a variation of the above formulation (4.6) can also be used to solve EPECs. 
An EPEC is defined as a game between N players at the top level where each top-
level player solves an optimization problem of the form of an MPEC. Hence, an 
EPEC with a common lower-level for each of the N upper-level players typical of 
Stackelberg leaders in energy production with the rest of the market represented by 
the lower-level problem is given by 
0),(
0),(
















 The formulation (4.17) with  0),(|),(  yxCyx  can be rewritten as  



















































   
 By Theorem 4.2, choosing a positive L will ensure that the SOS1 constraints 









and choosing a small enough L will ensure that the correct solution is achieved. 
Formulation (4.18) can then be solved as a Nash game among N players, and can be 
formulated as a complementarity problem by taking the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker 
















































































 Note that as described in detail in (Ehrenmann, 2004), (4.19) is not a square 
system. The reason for this is that the same set of lower-level variables are shared 
among all top-level players in the component MPECs of the EPEC. Hence, solutions 
to (4.19) cannot be computed using solvers in GAMS. Many workarounds are 
available for this (e.g. penalization methods (Ehrenmann, 2004)), and for the case of 
the specific EPEC considered in this chapter, we introduce a “balancing agent.” All 
lower-level variables and constraints that are common to all top-level player 
optimization problems are treated as separate variables for each top-level player. For 
example, the variables y above will be treated as separate variables yj for each of the 






































 A loose interpretation of the economic role of the balancing agent is the 
following. Without such an agent, Stackelberg leader j communicates with only the 
jth partition of the lower-level market, represented by yj. The balancing agent tries at 
minimal cost to couple the partitions into one integrated market, which is more 
realistic. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the above problem can then be 
added to (4.19) to ensure that the values of values of yj are the same. The following 
algorithm shows a method, then, to solve EPECs.  
4.3.2. Algorithm 4.2 to Solve Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium 
Constraints (Heuristic)  
(Solving EPECs Using (4.19) and Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions of (4.20)) 
 
Step 0: Pick a tolerance t. 
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Step 1: Solve the problem using the formulation (4.19) with L =t and the KKT 
conditions to (4.20). 
 
Step 2: Check solution by changing value of L in formulation. Decrease L until 
value for  objective function stays the same. Check with setting L = 
machine-ε. Then stop. 
 
4.3.3. Numerical Results for Equilibrium Programs with Equilibrium 
Constraints 
A corresponding EPEC where two players are at the top-level can also be formulated 
and solved by extending the MPEC method above. The formulation for the bottom 
level remains the same, and for the upper level, there are now two producers who 
determine quantities Q1 and Q2 whose objective functions are given as 
    2,12121  jQCQQQqqba jjj                                               (4.21) 
 Using the same datasets, let
32
 C1 = C2 = C. Then, the EPEC can be formulated 
as 
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 The constraints in (4.22) are the KKT conditions of the lower-level problem 
that have been reformulated as in (4.6). As described in Section 4.3.1, this problem 
can be expressed and solved as a complementarity problem using Algorithm 4.2 and 


























































































































































































































 The following tables (4.7-4.9) give the solutions under different datasets and 
cases
33
. Simple algebra can show that there exists a solution, and hence a true answer 
is also given in the table. 
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 Many different cases with different costs were also solved successfully, but only the ones 





Table 4.7: Results for Dataset 1 
Results A Solution Case 1 Case 2 L = machine-ε 
q1 = q2 1.333 1.333 1.111 1.333 
Q1 = Q2 4.000 4.000 4.333 4.000 
Price 2.333 2.333 2.111 2.333 
Profit Top 5.333 5.333 4.815 5.333 
Profit 
Bottom 






Table 4.8: Results for Dataset 2 
Results A Solution Case 1 Case 2 L = machine-ε 
q1 = q2 13.333 13.333 11.111 13.333 
Q1 = Q2 40.000 40.000 43.333 40.000 
Price 2.333 2.333 2.111 2.333 
Profit Top
34
 53.333 53.333 48.148 53.333 
Profit Bottom 17.778 17.778 12.346 17.778 
 
Table 4.9: Results for Dataset 3 
Results A Solution Case 1 Case 2 L = machine-ε 
q1 = q2 12.222 12.222 10.000 12.222 
Q1 = Q2 36.667 36.667 40.000 36.667 
Price 3.222 3.222 3.000 3.222 
Profit Top 44.815 44.815 40.000 44.815 
Profit Bottom 14.938 14.938 10.000 14.938 
 
 Again, in all three datasets, the Case 2 choice of L could not give an optimal 
solution, i.e., Nash equilibria at the top and bottom. Hence, all these datasets required 
a very small choice of L. Choosing L = machine-ε is a good option. Note that the 
EPEC has an extra player when compared to the MPEC; hence profits for all firms 
are lower in the EPEC study. Moreover, prices are also lower in the EPEC case, as 
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 Due to the deliberate selection of similar data, the profits for both top-level players are the same. 





expected with an extra Stackelberg leader with same marginal cost in the EPEC.  
These results can be seen when comparing Tables (4.4-4.6) with Tables (4.7-4.9). 
4.4. The North American Gas Model 
4.4.1. Introduction 
The advent of rising oil prices along with attitudes about decreasing greenhouse gas 
emissions in multiple sectors has lead to an interest in natural gas production for the 
future. The role of unconventional gas
35
, in particular, has greatly increased due to 
engineering advances such as hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling (NPC, 
2007). The projected role of shale gas in particular, especially in the United States but 
also elsewhere (Skagen, 2010) has lately been a major force in the increasing 
prominence of unconventional gas. In 2008, Cambridge Energy Research Associates 
indicated that this unconventional gas production could help delay by a decade the 
United States‟ need for substantial LNG imports (Economist, 2008). More recently, 
others gauge the U.S. shale gas impact in even more dramatic terms with estimates of 
up to 100 years of reserves. 
36
 Indeed, the Potential Gas Committee has concluded 
that the U.S. proved reserves of gas increased from 2006 to 2008 by a huge 35.4% 
from 1532.0 trillion cubic feet to 2074.1 (PGC, 2010). Others such as the petroleum 
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 Unconventional gas is defined as gas from tight sands, coalbed methane, and shale gas, and covers 
more low-permeability reservoirs that produce mostly natural gas (no associated hydrocarbon liquids) 
(NPC, 2007). 
36
 Keith O. Rattie, CEO of Questar, a natural gas and pipeline company, cited in “Awash in Fossil 





engineer Art Berman are more cautious about the ultimate supply due to the 
economics of producing shale gas (low gas prices in the U.S. recently) (Cohen, 2009) 
or steeper decline rates for shale wells (Steffy, 2009). Shale gas in the U.S. will be 
modeled using the World Gas Model (Gabriel et al., 2011c), restricted to North 
American nodes.  
 The World Gas Model
37
 (WGM) is a long-term, game theoretic model of 
global gas markets with representation of Cournot market power originally based on a 
North American version of the mode (Gabriel et al., 2005a), (Gabriel et al., 2005b) 
and eventually extended to a global version (Egging et al., 2009) for which the most 
recent version is (Gabriel et al., 2011c).  For the United States, the forecasts presented 
in the Annual Energy Outlook (April 2009 ARRA version) were used for the current 
study. For the rest of North America, the World Energy Outlook (IEA, 2008) was 
used.  The WGM was then extensively calibrated to match these multiple sources for 




 The most interesting change due to the presence of shale gas occurs in census 
region 7 (WGM node 7) where Haynesville and Barnett plays are present. This node 
                                                 
 
37
 National Science Foundation (DMS, Award #0106880), Principal Investigator ,S.A. Gabriel, 
“Computational Methods for Equilibrium Problems with Micro-Level Data,” 09/01/2001-08/31/2005 
and National Science Foundation (DMS, Award #0408943), Principal Investigator, S.A. Gabriel, 
“Methods and Models for Stochastic Energy Market Equilibria, “08/01/2004-07/31/2008. 
38
 See  (Gabriel et al., 2011c) for details on the countries and regions included as well as other relevant 





is used as a test example for the new MPEC solution technique. The formulation 
proposed is that the producer of shale at node 7 will be the first mover in the 
Stackelberg game (Gibbons, 1996). The entire lower level will be the World Gas 
Model restricted to North American nodes including other shale nodes. This 
formulation assumes that the shale producer at node 7 has market power over all other 
players. While there is some arbitrariness about this assumption, i.e. it might give the 
shale producer at node 7 too much market power, it nevertheless is an interesting 
market formulation to study because there is a chance for this scenario to play out in 
the future. Furthermore, this formulation can be used for bounding purposes when 
considering a wide variety of market dynamics. Other MPEC formulations might 
consider a trader, producer, or even the government at the upper-level. 
4.4.2. Shale Gas in the United States 
 The shale gas data were provided by the U.S. Department of Energy in the 
Annual Energy Outlook (2010) with shale gas production and Lower 48 onshore 
natural gas production datasets. 
39
  As compared to the version of the model from 
(Gabriel et al., 2011c), the World Gas Model was modified to contain three 
production nodes for each census region of the United States: conventional gas, shale 
gas, and non-shale unconventional gas.  
 A „Golombek‟ production cost function (Golombek & Gjelsvik, 1995)  












qQqqqC                                         
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was used for which the marginal supply cost curve is: 









qqC                               
 Here, Q is the production capacity, 0   is the minimum per unit cost, β > 0 
is the per unit linearly increasing cost term, and 0   is a term that induces high 
marginal costs when production is close to full capacity.  
 Skagen (Skagen, 2010) indicates that recent research has led to predicting a 
lower value of α for the cost function of shale gas when compared to conventional 
gas. Figure 4.2 shows that shale gas is now understood to have a lower price of 

















Conventional GasUnconventional Gas (Shale) 
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Figure 4.2: A Marginal Cost Structure for Shale Gas (Skagen, 2010) 
 
  
 Alternatively, others believe that initial positive results from shale gas 
extraction wells might not be sustainable in the long run (Cohen, 2009). In particular, 





and while shale appears to be a good resource right now, steep decline rates mean that 
higher extraction will lead to higher costs quickly (Cohen, 2009). 
 In the modification of the WGM, the shale gas cost curve has α (the y-
intercept of the marginal cost curve) lower and β (the slope of the marginal cost 
curve) higher than for conventional gas. The current debate about shale gas has been 
incorporated. While the lower initial cost of extraction is consistent with Skagen‟s 
observation, a higher marginal cost increase and higher marginal costs at higher 
quantities is consistent with Berman‟s claim that decline rates of shale wells will be 
higher. Hence, shale gas has a lower initial cost of extraction than conventional gas 
but a higher rate of increase for marginal cost.  It is important to note that this 
marginal cost curve for shale gas is by no means the final word but just one 
perspective developed for our modeling needs. 
 The other initial condition placed is that total production costs should be the 
same, so the integral of the marginal cost curve should be the same for both functions 
(conventional and shale gas).  This will ensure a positive production of both types of 
gas, which can be calibrated to real data. A comparison is provided with two other 
cases with higher total costs for shale production. Another reason why the total costs 
would be equal in the reference case is that producers drilling in the same region 
would encounter similar terrain, similar taxes, similar hurdles etc. Hence, α was 
reduced by 20% of the value of conventional gas based on Skagen (2010) and β was 
increased by an amount so that the integral of the marginal cost curve remains the 
same. An explanation of this is shown in Figure 4.3 below. Note that the values of γ 





portion of the marginal cost curve. The production cost data for conventional and 















Shale Gas Marginal 
Cost curve has 20% 
lower intercept
Shale Gas Marginal Cost curve slope is 
obtained by setting the total area under the 
curves (total cost) equal to each other.
Conventional Gas Marginal Cost Curve
Shale Gas Marginal Cost Curve
A Marginal Cost Curve for Shale Gas Production
 
Figure 4.3: A Marginal Cost Structure for Shale Gas 
 
 
 The following table provides the coverage of states and shale basins in the 















Wyoming Colorado           US_8 
Niobrara Colorado Nebraska Kansas         
US_4,  
US_8 
Cody Montana             US_8 











Kansas Oklahoma           
US_4,  
US_7 
New Albany Illinois Indiana Kentucky         
US_3,  
US_6 
Antrim Michigan Indiana Ohio         US_3 
Utica New York             US_2 
Marcellus New York Pennsylvania Ohio 
West 
Virginia 





Devonian Ohio Kentucky 
West 
Virginia 




Chattanooga Kentucky Virginia Tennessee Alabama Georgia     
US_5, 
US_6 
Conasauga Alabama Georgia           
US_5, 
US_6 
Floyd-Neal Mississippi Alabama           US_6 
Fayetteville Arkansas             US_7 
Hayneville/ 
Bossier 
Louisiana Texas           US_7 
Woodford/ 
Caney 
Oklahoma             US_7 
Barnett Texas             US_7 
Pearsall Texas             US_7 
Woodford  Oklahoma Texas           US_7 
Barnett and 
Woodford 
New Mexico Texas           
US_7, 
US_8 
Bend Texas             US_7 
Pierre New Mexico Colorado           US_8 
Lewis New Mexico Colorado           US_8 
Hermosa Utah             US_8 
 
4.4.3. Scenario Results 
This section describes numerical examples to solve the WGM (North American nodes 





even on large MPECs, this Algorithm 4.1 works well. Five different cases were run, 
which are described below. The results from these cases are consistent with economic 
theory, and are presented in graphical form.  
 Computational results show that a solution exists for the lower-level 
complementarity problem (which includes the shale producer at node 7). This means 
that a feasible solution for the MPEC exists as well, as the lower-level 
complementary problem contains both the complementary restrictions as well as 
constraints for the upper-level player of the MPEC. The method of disjunctive 
constraints did not provide a feasible solution for this problem with the solvers SBB 
and CONOPT (GAMS, 2010). 
 The WGM restricted to the North American nodes has 30 producers, of which 
seven are for shale gas and seven for unconventional gas production in the United 
States. The rest produce conventional gas. There are a total of 15 production nodes, of 
which nine correspond to the census regions for the lower-48 states. There are also 
three traders (one each for United States, Canada, and Mexico, the three countries in 
the model), along with eight periods from 2005-2040 (the last two five-year periods 
are not reported to avoid end-of-horizon bias), and two seasons (high and low 
demand) in each period. The decision variables are operating levels (production, 
storage injection, etc.) as well as investment levels (pipeline, liquefaction capacity, 
etc.). Prices are set to 2005 US$. The whole complementarity model has about 9456 
variables and takes 243.2 seconds to solve on a 2.0 GHz processor with 2 GB 





 The MPEC version of the WGM restricted to North America was formulated 
with the shale gas producer in census region 7 as the top-level player. Census region 7 
contains both the Barnett and Haynesville shale plays, two of the most important ones 
in the United States
40
. The MPEC version was solved using Algorithm 4.1. The 
algorithm solved the problem in approximately three hours on the same computer 
described above, though the time was different for each case. 
 The following five cases were considered, with the first (Base Case) modeled 
as a complementarity problem and the rest as MPECs for purposes of comparison: 
1) Base: The Base Case for the WGM restricted to North America formulated as 
a complementarity problem and calibrated according to the Annual Energy 
Outlook (April 2009 ARRA version) and the World Energy Outlook (IEA, 
2008). 
2) MPEC: The MPEC version of the Base Case. The shale producer in census 
region 7 was placed at the upper level and all other players at the lower level. 
3) MoreShale: A higher production of shale gas was considered by increasing 
the daily capacity available, with a 10% increase for 2015, 2020; a 15% 
increase for 2025, 2030; and a 20% increase for 2035, 2040. These numbers 
are approximations of increases given by the Annual Energy Outlook between 
the 2008 and 2009 reports‟ predictions. While the 2010 reports did not show 
such an increase, for our purposes this case was developed to show what 
might happen if a similar increase took place after 2015. This case is modeled 
as an MPEC. 
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4) ShaleTax: All shale-producing firms are taxed $0.39/MCF (39 cents for every 
thousand cubic feet of natural gas produced) from 2015 to 2040. This is in line 
with the tax proposed for Pennsylvania shale production in the Marcellus 
shale play, which was later overturned (Barnes, 2010). No other value for a 
shale tax has so far been found from any legislature. This case is modeled as 
an MPEC. 
5) AllTax: All natural gas is taxed at $0.39/MCF from 2015 to 2040. This case 
will help see if the shale players, especially the one in census region 7, have 
any comparative advantage when everyone is taxed. Modeled as an MPEC. 
 The results are presented below. The MPEC case produces lower average 
prices (e.g., $6.74/MMBTU vs. $6.94/MMBTU in 2025) and higher total production 
(e.g., 844.2 BCM vs. 830.2 BCM in 2025) and consumption (Gibbons, 1996) when 
compared to the Base Case for all years. Moreover, as expected, the MoreShale case 
showed an overall increase in shale production when compared to the Base Case (e.g., 
111.5 BCM vs. 89.4 BCM in 2025) and for the shale producer in census region 7, 
proved to be the most profitable.  The profits at node 7 increase by more than three 
times in 2025 when compared to the Base Case. This shows the advantage of being 
the Stackelberg leader and allowing collection of more profits and also serves as a 
cautionary numerical result for market regulators and other interested parties. 
 The MoreShale case shows that it will be advantageous for producers as well 
as consumers (with prices dropping in nodes with large amounts of shale). However, 
the fact that total production doesn‟t change much with the invoking of the tax (shale 





corroborated by looking at producer profits as well, where the imposition of tax 
barely changes total profit. Since Node 8 has a relatively abundant supply of 
conventional, unconventional, and shale gas, it can change production around 
depending on the demands. Hence, nodes 8 and 9 remain relatively unchanged with 
the imposition of tax. Moreover, the production for shale producers is as expected, 
and the imposition of tax does less to harm any production, and overall profits remain 
relatively stable. Also, this might be a policy argument for saying that the tax will 
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 N_US3, for example, gives profit at the node for US census region 3. 
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 Data for consumption and prices (Figure 4.7 and Table 4.11, respectively), 
however, show that the producers will pass most of the tax onto the consumers. This 
also shows the strength of the World Gas Model, by predicting which areas will show 
a change in prices. Nodes 5, and 6, will take on the burden of the tax with prices 
going slightly up ($7.14/MMBTU vs. 7.07 $/MMBTU) and consumption relatively 
unchanged when compared to the MPEC case. Nodes 1 and 2 contain a majority of 
the Marcellus shale play; hence prices there go up with the imposition of a tax on 
shale gas. Moreover, US nodes 7 and 8 have high production, and it‟s profitable for 
these producers to sell at a lower price in their own market and at a higher price to the 
other nodes. However, imposing a tax on US Node 7 increases prices at that particular 
node in 2025 when compared to the MPEC case. Since the shale producer at node 7 is 
the Stackelberg leader, in this case it can derive more profits by passing the tax onto 
its own consumption node.  Note that the prices under the two tax cases at node 7 
(4.94 $/MMBTU and 5.13 $/MMBTU in the ShaleTax and AllTax case, respectively) 
are still lower than the price for the Base Case (5.72 $/MMBTU, when the shale 
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Figure 4.7: Consumption in 2025 as Predicted by the Model 
 
 
 Table 4.11: Average Prices in $/MMBTU in 2025 
Region Base MPEC MoreShale ShaleTax AllTax 
Alaska 6.17 6.17 6.17 6.17 6.17 
Canada 6.94 6.69 6.02 6.50 6.34 
Mexico 6.66 6.65 5.63 6.70 6.92 
US Nodes 1 & 2 8.85 8.91 8.59 8.98 8.88 
US Nodes 3 & 4 7.48 7.52 7.02 7.48 7.37 
US Nodes 5 & 6 7.36 7.07 6.76 7.14 7.14 
US Node 7 5.72 4.88 4.59 4.94 5.13 








This chapter provides a novel way to solve mathematical programs with equilibrium 
constraints. The new method has been shown to be computationally tractable, and 
able to solve MPECs where the lower level is a complementarity problem. An 
extension to solve EPECs is also presented. 
 The method was first applied to numerical examples for MPECs. It 
outperformed the method of disjunctive constraints in two ways. First, the selection of 
the constant L for Algorithm 4.1 did not prove as difficult as the selection of the 
constant K in disjunctive constraints. Second, with numerical tests the method proved 
to be computationally quicker than the method of disjunctive constraints. The method 
was also shown to be able to solve a numerical example of an EPEC, but extensive 
numerical and theoretical results will be part of future work. 
 The method was applied to an example of a shale gas producer in the US 
natural gas market acting as a dominant player. The results show that in the case of a 
Stackelberg structure, the profits of the producer are not negatively affected with the 
current proposals for taxes. However, with this structure the producers are able to 
pass the tax onto the consumer, as profits do not decrease with the implementation of 
tax but prices do go up. Moreover, if more resources are present, the producer is able 
to take advantage of them. While in actuality the Stackelberg player might not have 
such an advantage, this setup helps show how under this scenario, producers can 










Chapter 5:  Solving Discretely-Constrained Mixed Linear 
Complementarity Problems 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides solution techniques for DC-MLCPs. In particular, this chapter 
will consider discretely-constrained Nash games (DC-Nash), where some of the 
decision variables are constrained to be integer-valued. These games have been 
formulated as complementary problems (Cottle et al., 2009) in the literature. 
However, the discretely-constrained versions have often been needed to be solved 
using inspection; for example, a bimatrix game table (Gibbons, 1996) which has 
finite, discrete choices to choose from. 
 When solving DC-MLCPs, it is important to realize that a particular instance 
might not have integer solutions. A compromise would be to get solutions that are as 
close to integer as possible. While this chapter does not provide theoretical arguments 
for the near-integer solutions, the numerical results presented corroborate that the new 
technique helps achieve integer solutions where appropriate. The method presented in 
this chapter is shown to be better than the method of (Gabriel et al., 2011a), (Gabriel 
et al., 2011b) in computational effort and because the method in this dissertation does 
not require the selection of a constant while the method in (Gabriel et al., 2011a), 
(Gabriel et al., 2011b) requires the selection of a specified constant. 
 First, a description of the two relaxation conditions will be given. Then, a 





(Gabriel et al., 2011a), (Gabriel et al., 2011b). Finally, the methods from Chapter 4 
will be applied to solve this resulting two-level problem formulation for numerical 
examples that are DC-Nash games and discretely-constrained network problems.  
 A portion of this chapter has been presented in (Gabriel et al., 2011a), 
(Gabriel et al., 2011b). However, a new way to solve these problems is presented in 
this dissertation which was not used in the aforementioned papers. Both papers 
(Gabriel et al., 2011a), (Gabriel et al., 2011b) used disjunctive constraints to solve the 
DC-MLCPs, but this dissertation uses the technique of SOS Type 1 variables 
explained in Chapter 4. The examples taken from (Gabriel et al., 2011a), (Gabriel et 
al., 2011b) are exactly the same as in the papers but the solution technique is 
different. An extra example with computational time is provided to further support 
the use of Chapter 4 techniques as opposed to disjunctive constraints which was not 
discussed in the two papers (Gabriel et al., 2011a), (Gabriel et al., 2011b). Hence, all 
the examples in this chapter were solved by the solution technique developed in 
Chapter 4, which was original work that is part of this dissertation. But the problem 
formulation presented in this chapter and the theory behind the formulation was 
developed in two papers (Gabriel et al., 2011a), (Gabriel et al., 2011b) and cannot be 
regarded as original work. The solution technique of Chapter 4, however, proves to be 





5.2. Discretely-Constrained Mixed Linear Complementarity Problems 
Recall from Chapter 2 that a general, discretely-constrained mixed linear 
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 From this formulation, if  
d
z1  and  dz2  were continuous variables, the 
problem would simplify to a linear complementary problem. Since they are not, one 
obvious solution is to relax them to be continuous variables, and then solve the 
problem hoping for an (approximate) integer solution. However, close inspection 
shows that the complementary conditions also can be relaxed, giving another option 
for an approximate solution. The next two subsections show how this is done and 
follows the initial problem description from (Gabriel et al., 2011a), (Gabriel et al., 
2011b). 
5.2.1 Epsilon-Integrality 
Consider the conditions   11 , DdZz d    and   22 , DdZz d    from (5.1). Assume 
these conditions are to be relaxed to make this problem easier. Without loss of 





similar. Then, consider a small deviation NiDrri ,...,1,0,, 11   through which this 
discrete variable is relaxed. Given any feasible set M, the problem becomes to 
minimize this deviation from integrality while still being in this feasible set. This is 
formulated by (5.2) below 
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                            (5.2) 
 In (5.2), the integer value i is selected that is closest to a continuous value in 
M. Note, however, that the objective function contains a nonlinear function. This 
absolute value function can be decomposed into its positive part and negative part so 
that the objective function is no longer nonlinear as in (5.3). 
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  This is one way to relax the DC-MLCP. From now on, this will be referred to 
as ε-integrality. This relaxation, along with another one described next, will be used 






From (5.1), consider the complementary condition 












AAq                                             (5.4) 














































                                                (5.5) 
 The goal is to relax the last line equality condition in (5.5). To obtain a 
solution that is approximate, the last equality need not equal zero but can be very 
close to zero. In fact, a deviation similar to the one for integrality can be developed 
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 Note that different ζ‟s could be used in the last equation in (5.6) as 























 However, this relaxation provides a same solution as the one given in (5.6) because as only one of the 





 Again, the problem becomes to minimize this deviation from complementary 
whilst still being in this feasible set. This is formulated by (5.7) below 
 
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 The nonlinear equality condition (a product) can be handled the same way the 
product was handled in Chapter 4. Hence, reformulated to be solved with SOS Type 1 
variables, (5.7) becomes 
 
   
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5.2.3. Complementarity, Integrality Trade-off 
One of the advantages that relaxing both complementary and integrality gives is that 
we can figure out the tradeoff of relaxing one versus the other. In practice, different 





5.1 shows the idea behind this tradeoff. This can be thought of as the Pareto frontier 





for Integrality vs. 
Complementary
If the region above 
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contains 0 then an 




Figure 5.1: The Tradeoff Between Complementary and Integrality 
 
  
 Although the whole Pareto frontier might not have a smooth convex shape as 
shown in the figure, it is motivation enough to study different variations. Moreover, a 
point on the tradeoff does not necessarily need to correspond to an integer solution to 
the DC-MLCP. In the future sections, at least the endpoints of the tradeoff curve (the 
intersections of the curve with the axes) will be calculated to give an indication of the 





5.2.4. Formulation to Solve Discretely-Constrained Mixed Linear 
Complementary problems 
The following formulation is from (Gabriel et al., 2011a) for solving DC-MLCPs 
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 In the following formulation (5.8),  
i1ri
w  are SOS1 variables implies that ,...312111 ,, rrr www  are 





         
 
   
   
 
 
   
   
 
 
   
   























































































































































































































 Here, 21, are predetermined weights attached to ε-integrality and ζ-
complementarity, respectively. These weights can be used to determine the tradeoff 
decision between ε-integrality and ζ-complementarity. 
5.3. Discretely-Constrained Nash-Cournot Games 
One way to solve Nash-Cournot games is to first convert them to complementary 
problems. This requires that the objective and constraint functions be differentiable 
and that the KKT conditions can be formulated. When some of the variables are 
integer-valued (e.g., binary yes/no, integer production), the KKT conditions are not 
valid because the functions are no longer continuous. This section shows an approach 
by  (Gabriel et al., 2011b) that provides a compromise between complementarity and 
integrality. This is done by first relaxing the discretely-constrained variables to their 
continuous analogs and taking KKT conditions for this relaxed problem. Gabriel et al.  
(Gabriel et al., 2011b) converted these KKT conditions to disjunctive-constraints 
form (Fortuny-Amat & McCarl, 1981) and solved them along with the original 
integer restrictions re-inserted in a mixed-integer, linear program (MILP). The integer 
conditions were then further relaxed, but targeted using penalty terms in the objective 
function. This MILP by (Gabriel et al., 2011b) relaxes both complementarity and 
integrality but tries to find minimum deviations for both and as such is an example of 
bi-objective problem (Cohon, 1978). This section will follow the same methodology 
except the technique of SOS type 1 variables from Chapter 4 will be used instead of 
disjunctive constraints.  
 The advantage of the technique presented in this chapter over the formulation 





formulation outlined in (Gabriel et al., 2011b), does not need to be selected. Instead 
SOS Type 1 variables are used as in Chapter 4. This method is also shown to be 
computationally quicker than the method of disjunctive constraints, and numerical 
evidence is provided later in this chapter. Note that for all numerical tests presented in 
this dissertation, the solutions were the same as in (Gabriel et al., 2011a), (Gabriel et 
al., 2011b). 
 The next sections provide a formulation based on the one presented in section 
5.2. Then, numerical results for two different discretely-constrained Nash games are 
presented. The first one has discrete restrictions on the production quantities while the 
second one has discrete startup/shutdown variables. 
5.3.1. Formulation of a DC-Nash game by Gabriel et al. (2011b) 
For the DC-Nash game, assume there are several Cournot power producers that 
maximize their profit simultaneously by choosing their optimal production quantities. 
Their objective function (profit) depends on the production of the competitors 
through the market demand curve (relationship between the total production and the 
market price) as well as their own marginal cost. Players p = 1,...,P seek optimal 
values for their decision vectors PpXx pp ,...,1,ˆ  by minimizing their cost 
functions (or negative profit functions) ),( pp xf   such that 
pppppppp Xxxxfxxf   ),ˆ,()ˆ,ˆ(                                                                      (5.9) 
 Here p
npx  represents the variables under player p‟s control with x
-p
 the 
remaining variables for other players. Also, px̂ means an equilibrium value to x
p
 and 





 ppqpppkpppjpp SqxEkxhIjxgxC  ,0;,...,1,0)(;,...,1,0)(|             (5.10) 
and p
n




r SnrZx \,...,1,   . Here Sp represents those indices for x
p
 that relate to 





find px̂ , p = 1,…, P such that 
pppppppp Cxxxfxxf   ),ˆ,()ˆ,ˆ(                                        (5.11) 































                                                              (5.12) 
For the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of (5.12) to be equivalent to solving 
that optimization problem, the assumption that the functions ),( pp xf   are convex 
and a constraint qualification (see (Bazaraa et al., 1993) for generalization of these 
assumptions that will also lead to KKT conditions being sufficient for optimality) 
holds (e.g. )(),( ppk
pp
j xhxg linear) is needed. The KKT conditions for player p's 























































      (5.13) 
Gabriel et al. (2011b) showed that the solution to (5.13) with the discrete restrictions 
inserted back is the same as the solution to (5.9). 















































   is restricted to be quadratic and 
















































         (5.14) 
 Gabriel et al. (2011b) reformulate the continuous relaxation of the original 
problem (5.9) by using the complementarity problem form of the Nash problem 
suitably relaxed as in (5.13). These KKT conditions are equivalent to a set of 














































































           (5.15) 
for suitably large values of pK1 and 
pK2 that can be computed as described in  (Gabriel 
et al., 2011b). 
 An alternative method is to use SOS Type 1 variables as described in Chapter 
4, which will be used here so the suitably large values of pK1 and 
pK2  do not need to 
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 Using the quadratic form of f 
p 
and the linear forms of g 
p
 and h 
p
 from above, 
results in the following linear, mixed-integer (with SOS1 variables, that are defined 






 and the integer 
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 Note that the above problem requires integral restrictions and complementary 
restrictions to hold at the same time, and may prove to be infeasible (Gabriel et al., 
2011b). This is the crucial conversion to a two-level problem. In (5.17), the upper-





level problem, with only the Nash-Cournot game at the bottom level reformulated 
with SOS1 constraints being equivalent to solving a complementary problem.  
 The one-level complementary problem can be infeasible, so it needs to be 
relaxed. The relaxations introduced are the Epsilon-Integrality (Section 5.2.1) and 
Sigma-Complementary (Section 5.2.2) for the problem to be feasible. Minimizing 
these deviations can be put in the objective function, making this one-level problem a 
two-level problem. The lower-level solves a relaxed DC-Nash game while the upper-
level minimizes the deviations from complementary and integrality. To ensure that 
the above reformulation does not have a conflict between complementarity and 
integrality 
46
, the following relaxed version of the problem is employed. 
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                     (5.19) 
 In the above formulation (5.18)-(5.19), the  pri1 are used to target the 
specified integer values (ε-integrality) and pp 21 , are used to relax complementarity 
(ζ-complementarity), both of which are minimized in the objective function 
weighting the two objective function parts with positive weights ω₁ and ω₂. Thus, 
minimizing these deviations helps find an optimal integer solution, as described in 
(Gabriel et al., 2011a). 
5.3.2. First Numerical Example 
This section presents the results of numerical examples for solving discretely-
constrained Nash-Cournot games from the theory outlined in the previous subsection. 
The first example constrains the production quantities to be integer while the second 
example has continuous production quantities but binary startup/shutdown variables. 
In both examples, seven variations are considered. These variations go through 
different relaxation techniques and combinations of formulations to be described 
later. The problems selected can be shown to have unique solutions by simple 
algebra. 
 The results show that formulation (5.18)-(5.19) provides solutions to the 





before, (5.17) can lead to an infeasible solution. Moreover, relaxing complementarity 
in (5.18)-(5.19) but keeping integer restrictions also leads to a discrete feasible 
solution. Both numerical examples show that relaxing complementarity is essential to 
obtaining discrete solutions. Enforcing discrete restrictions, even by integer 
relaxation, does not help obtain the integer solutions and relaxation of complementary 
conditions is necessary. A combination of both, as presented in (5.18)-(5.19) helps 
obtain the required solutions in both cases.  
 For ease of presentation and comparison but with no loss of generality, 
consider a Nash-Cournot game with two players (p = 1, 2). Given an inverse demand 
curve Price = a - b(Quantity), each player chooses Zqp to maximize their profit 
function 
 pppppp qqqPriceProfit   2                                   (5.20) 
where the term in parentheses denotes cost as a function of quantity selected i.e., qp. 
The formulation of the game is the same as discussed in the previous subsection. 
    For the first example, let a = 6, b = 1, β₁ = β₂=1, and ρ₁=ρ₂=1, as well as adding 
capacity constraints for both players of the form 
maxqqp                                                                               (5.21) 
where qmax = 4. Since only integer-valued production qp is allowed, a bimatrix payoff 







Table 5.1: Bimatrix Nash-Cournot Game, Profits(q1/q2) 
 0 1 2 3 4 
0 (0,0) (0,3) (0,2) (0,-3) (0,-12) 
1 (3,0) (2,2) (1,0) (0,-6) (-1,-16) 
2 (2,0) (0,1) (-2,-2) (-4,-9) (-6,-20) 
3 (-3,0) (-6,0) (-9,-4) (-12,-12) (-15,-24) 
4 (-12,0) (-16,-1) (-20,-6) (-24,-15) (-28,-28) 
 
 Clearly q1 = q2 = 1 is the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Another 
way to solve Nash-Cournot games is by simultaneously solving the problems 






















                              (5.22) 
for p = 1, 2.  Since the slope of the inverse demand function b > 0 and βp > 0, the 
KKT conditions are both necessary and sufficient for solving these problems.  These 












               (5.23) 
for each p = 1, 2. However, the KKT conditions are only valid if qp, p = 1, 2 are 
continuous-valued.  Thus, the resulting LCP needs to avoid discrete restrictions on the 
qp variables.  In this particular example, solving the above LCP after assuming 





 However, changing some of the data to a = 9 and ρ₂ = 3 results in a non-
integer solution of q₁ = 1.733, q₂ = 1.067, and Price = 6.2. But the new bimatrix 
payoff table for the original discrete version of this game with these new data (Table 
5.2), shown below, gives a unique discrete solution of q₁ = 2, q₂ = 1 with Price = 6. 
    
Table 5.2: Nash-Cournot Game, Profits(q1/q2), (Only Adjustments a=9, ρ₂ = 3) 
 0 1 2 3 4 
0 (0,0) (0,4) (0,4) (0,0) (0,-8) 
1 (6,0) (5,3) (4,2) (3,-3) (2,-12) 
2 (8,0) (6,2) (4,0) (2,-6) (0,-16) 
3 (6,0) (3,1) (0,-2) (-3,-9) (-6,-20) 
4 (0,0) (-4,0) (-8,-4) (-12,-12) (-16,-24) 
     
 This example shows what can happen if the relaxed LCP does not provide 
integer-valued answers.  Next, more numerical tests are described with the new data a 
= 9, b = 1, β₁ = β₂ = 1, ρ₁ = 1, and ρ₂ = 3. 
 The first variation is to solve the continuous version of the LCP (i.e., without 
any integer restrictions) relating to (5.9) ("MLCP"). Solving the original version of 
the problem with the integer restrictions relating to (5.9) is variation 2 ("Bimatrix") 
and is solved by examining the bimatrix payoff table.  In the remaining variations to 
be described, there are two ways of forcing integrality of the solutions.  First, the 





variation 3 being (5.17) and variation 4 also relaxing complementarity (ζ-
complementary) in (5.17).  
 Second, in variation 5, complementarity can be relaxed without constraining 
the problem to have integer solutions, hence "continuous variables" for the problem 
description.  Hence, we should not expect integer solutions. Finally, in variations 6 
and 7, integers can be targeted using the ε deviational variables (5.18)-(5.19) (ε-
integrality).     In variation 6, no relaxation for complementarity is allowed.  Variation 
7 allows relaxation for both complementarity and integrality (ζ-complementary and ε-
integrality).   Table 5.3 describes the various possible formulations considered. 
 
Table 5.3: Description of Formulation Variations 
Variation ζ-Complementary ε-Integrality Problem Description 
1 No No MLCP 
2 No No Bimatrix 
3 No No Integer variables 
4 Yes No Integer variables 
5 Yes No Continuous variables 
6 No Yes Continuous variables 
7 Yes Yes Continuous variables 
 
 
5.3.3. Results for First Numerical Example 






Table 5.4: Summary of Results (a = 9, b = 1, β₁= β₂ = 1,ρ₁ = 1,  ρ₂ = 3) 
Variation Solution (q₁,q₂) Price Profits (P1, P2) 
1 (1.733,1.067) 6.2 (6.01, 2.28) 
2 (2,1) 6 (6,2) 
3 Infeasible Infeasible Infeasible 
4 (2,1) 6 (6,2) 
5 (1.733,1.067) 6.2 (6.01, 2.28) 
6 (1.733,1.067) 6.2 (6.01, 2.28) 
7 (2,1) 6 (6,2) 
 
Table 5.5: Summary of Results (a = 9, b = 1, β₁= β₂ = 1,ρ₁ = 1,  ρ₂ = 3) 
Variation Sum ε Sum ζ 
1 n/a n/a 
2 n/a n/a 
3 n/a n/a 
4 n/a 0.2 
5 n/a 0 
6 0.334 n/a 
7 0 0.2 
 
 Table 5.4 shows that a solution to the integer-constrained Nash game is to 
have q₁ = 2, q₂ = 1 with a resulting price of 6 (variation 2).  When the integer 





price of 6.2 (variation 1).  Solving the mixed integer programming (MIP) version of 
the problem but forcing exact complementarity and integrality results in an infeasible 
solution (variation 3) as would be expected.  Interestingly, the original integer 
solution to the Nash problem can be obtained with the MIP approach as long as 
complementarity is relaxed (variation 4) or when integers are targeted using ε's 
(without enforcing integrality) along with the complementarity relaxation (variation 
7).   
  It is interesting to note that variation 7 is a validation of the earlier discussion 
for obtaining integer solutions to DC-Nash.  From the perspective of accuracy in 
attaining the original production values and price, the MIP approach is correct in this 
instance and thus provides an alternative, viable method for solving such problems.  It 
is interesting to note the difference in results between variations 4 and 5.  The former 
achieves the correct integer solution but directly forces the variables in GAMS to be 
integer-valued.  The latter allows relaxation of complementarity but does not give 
integer solutions as expected. Furthermore, variation 6 also does not get the correct 
integer solution even though the using the ε deviational variables were included. 
 To compare computational time, the formulation of the numerical example 
above was expanded where the number of players P was increased but the marginal 
cost for half the players was set the same as player 1 and the other half the same as 
player 2 from the above example for variation 7. The following Figure 5.2 shows this 
result with an increase in the number of players for the method of this dissertation 


























Computational Time to Solve for Number of Players (First 
Numerical Example DC-Nash Game)
SOS 1 (Method of Chapter 4)
DisjCons (Gabriel et al., 2011b)
 
Figure 5.2: Computational Time for First Numerical Example 
5.3.4. Numerical Example Relevant to Production Systems 
In many applications, the quantities qp are actually positive real numbers but there are 
also constraints of the form 
maxmin qsqqs ppp                                                             (5.24) 
where sp is a binary variable that is 1 when the player p chooses to produce and 0 
when player p chooses to not produce. Here the binary variable sp might for example 
relate to the on/off status for a power generation unit. If on, then the minimum and 
maximum production quantities are in force. If off, then both the upper and lower 
bounds are equal to zero.  
 The original capacity constraint is replaced by the one above and the resulting 





1.5, and qmax = 4. The binary variables sp are the ones targeted when complementarity 
and integrality are relaxed but still allowing for continuous generation variables. The 
following tables summarize the results. 
 
Table 5.6: Summary of Results (Example Relevant to Production Systems) 
Variation Solution (q₁,q₂) Binary(s1, s2) Profits (P1, P2) 
1 (1.733,1.067) (0.347,0.213) (6.01, 2.28) 
2 (1.625,1.5) (1,1) (5.28, 2.06) 
3 (1.625,1.5) (1,1) (5.28, 2.06) 
4 (1.625,1.5) (1,1) (5.28, 2.06) 
5 (1.733,1.067) (0.347,0.711) (6.01, 2.28) 
6 (1.625,1.5) (1,1) (5.28, 2.06) 






Table 5.7: Summary of Results (Example Relevant to Production Systems) 
Variation Price Sum ε Sum ζ 
1 6.2 n/a n/a 
2 5.875 n/a n/a 
3 5.875 n/a n/a 
4 5.875 n/a 0 
5 6.2 n/a 0 
6 5.875 0 n/a 
7 5.875 0 0 
 
 The solutions to this example are very different from the previous one. 
Variation 2 shows the true solution when the variables sp, p = 1, 2 are forced to be 
binary.   Namely, player 2 produces at the minimum level of 1.5 but player 1 chooses 
a value of 1.625, in between the minimum and maximum.  The continuous relaxation 
(variation 1) achieves higher profits for both players as would be expected due to less 
restrictive constraints but does not end up with binary values for the sp variables. 
Interestingly, all other variations on relaxation are able to achieve the correct 
production quantities (qp) and binary production indicators (sp) except for variation 5 
when only complementarity is relaxed.  For this particular problem, forcing 
integrality is key (through one of the two aforementioned methods) as variations 3, 4, 
6, and 7 all give the correct binary solution for sp, p = 1, 2. 
 Similar to the previous example, the number of players was increased so that 





following Figure 5.3 shows this result with an increase in the number of players for 
the method of this dissertation compared to the method by (Gabriel et al., 2011b), 
both for variation 7. Again, the method of disjunctive constraints is computationally 
slower for this example when compared to the SOS1 method. However, this time the 
advantage of SOS1 is not as strong as for the first numerical example in the previous 
section. A reason for this can be that since the decision variables are binary, 
formulating as SOS1 might not have that much of an advantage. This contrasts with 





















Computational Time to Solve for Number of Players (Example 
Relevant to Production Systems)
SOS 1 (Method of Chapter 4)
DisjCons (Gabriel et al., 2011b)
 
Figure 5.3: Computational Time for Example Relevant to Production Systems 
 
5.4. Discretely-Constrained Network Problems 
This section considers discretely-constrained network problems. Note that these 





instructive to look at these network examples separately as well, as extra intuition can 
be gained from considering transmission lines. The first example is a continuation 
form the previous section, with two producers. The second example has four 
producers over two nodes. 
5.4.1. First Network Example 
Consider a power market with two producers supplying to one demand node as 
shown in Figure 5.4. Producers 1 and 2 choose to produce quantities q₁ and q₂ 
respectively, and supply it to meet inelastic demand d, while there are transmission 
lines (with flow variables q₁₂, q₁₃, q₂₃) between the three nodes. There is a marginal 
utility of demand cd and marginal costs c₁ and c₂ for producers 1 and 2, respectively. 
There is also a market operator who maximizes its own profits by buying from the 






Figure 5.4: Diagram of First Network Example 
 







































where λn is the (endogenous) price at node n. Note that the producer p is active at 
node n = p. 
 The market operator solves the following optimization problem (with 
pq introduced to have a square system). The equality constraints set the power flow 
(q₁₃ for example, signifies flow from node 1 to node 3) equal to the power produced 
and the inequality constraints give a bound on the maximum amount of flow allowed. 
Flow can be towards the opposite direction as well which is signified by a negative 
number (i.e., if q₁₃ is negative, then the flow is from node 3 to node 1), so the 




































































                                       (5.26) 
 The above optimization problems can be combined to form an MCP, which 
gives a solution to the game. Our goal here is to see if we restricted the quantities 
produced and flows to be integer-valued, if we can come up with an equilibrium 
solution. The following Table 5.8 gives the values of the parameters used for solving 
















23q  c1 c2 cd 
18 20.5 12 15 15 2 1 5 
        
 Hence, producer 2 has a lower marginal cost so will attempt to supply more 
units of q₂. We use the same process as in the previous section and formulate the 
problem according the variations in Table 5.9. Note that we are not considering the 
bimatrix game for this example, so there is no variation 2. Table 5.10 shows the 
results for the example under different variations. 
 
Table 5.9: Description of Formulation Variations 
Variation ζ-Complementary ε-Integrality Problem Description 
1 No No MLCP 
3 No No Integer variables 
4 Yes No Integer variables 
5 Yes No Continuous variables 
6 No Yes Continuous variables 






Table 5.10: Solution to Power Market Example 
Variations 1 3 4 5 6 7 
q₁ 9.5 Infeasible 10 9.5 9.5 10 
q₂ 20.5 Infeasible 20 20.5 20.5 20 
q₁₂ -5.5 Infeasible -5 -5.5 -5.5 -5 
q₁₃ 15 Infeasible 15 15 15 15 
q₂₃ 15 Infeasible 15 15 15 15 
λ₁ 2 Infeasible 2 2 2 2 
λ₂ 2 Infeasible 2 2 2 2 
λ₃ 5 Infeasible 5 5 5 5 
d 30 Infeasible 30 30 30 30 
Sum ε n/a n/a n/a n/a 1 0 
Sum ζ n/a n/a 0.5 0 n/a 0.5 
 
 Note that again, variation 7 gives an integer solution. Comparison to variation 
4 is critical, as both of them give the same solution. However, variation 7 provides 
integer solutions but does not explicitly enforce integrality, while variation 4 requires 
imposing integer restrictions to get to the answer. Variation 3 proves to be infeasible, 
while variations 5 and 6 show that only including σ-complementarity or only 
including ε-integrality is not sufficient to achieve an integer solution for all the 
variables that are constrained as such. Note that prices at each node (λ₁, λ₂, λ₃) stay 





provide any solution, so not only does variation 7 provide an integer solution; it does 
so without imposing integer restrictions and also delivering reasonable prices. 
5.4.2. Second Network Example 
The next example is from  (Gabriel et al., 2011a) and depicts an equilibrium in an 
energy network (e.g., natural gas, electricity) where production, consumption, and 
transmission of the energy product are analyzed.  
 Four energy price-taking producers (A, B, C, D) are modeled with the first two 
located at node 1 and the latter two at node 2.  The production levels are denoted as 
p
nq  where node n ∈ {1, 2} and producer p ∈ {A, B, C, D}.  Similarly, the sales levels 
are denoted as pns .  Lastly, at node 1, the two producers A and B have the additional 
option of sending energy to node 2 and BA ff 1212 ,  represents the associated amounts of 
flow.  (Note that the producers at node 2 are not allowed to ship their product to node 
1.) 
 Both producers A and B at node 1 have structurally a similar optimization 
problem shown below just for producer A.  For node 2, the producers have an 
optimization that is almost the same as at node 1 with the exception that no flow 
variables (nor related terms) are included. 












































    where 
 πn is the producer price at node n ∈ {1, 2} 
  AA qc 11 is the (marginal) production cost function assumed to be linear, i.e., 
  0, 11111  AAAAA qqc  . 
 REG12 represents the nonnegative, regulated tariff for using the network from 
node 1 to node 2; REG12 is a fixed parameter. 
 η₁₂ is the congestion tariff for using the network from node 1 to node 2 and a 
variable from another part of the equilibrium model 
 Aq1 is the maximum production quantity
47
 
 Each producer is maximizing their profit (5.27) by choosing appropriate 
nonnegative levels of production, sales and flow variables subject to not exceeding 
production limits, and consistency between sales, production, and flow (5.27).  The 
KKT conditions for each of the producers' problems are both necessary and sufficient 
(Bazaraa et al., 1993) given the functions chosen and these conditions for each of the 
producers (producer A at node 1, producer B at node 1, producer C at node 2, 
producer D at node 2) are as follows: 
                                                 
 
47
































































































































                                                                                    (5.31) 
 In addition to the KKT conditions for the four producer problems, there are 
market-clearing conditions that force supply to equal demand: 
 












                                                         (5.32) 
 Note that the terms in square brackets are the net supply at each node 
(assuming no losses) and Dn(πn), n = 1, 2 are the nodal demand as a function of the 
price πn.  While the producers depicted above operate using the network, there is 


























                                            (5.33) 
 Here, the TSO controls the variable g₁₂ which is the flow from node 1 to node 
2, )( 12gc
TSO is a network operations cost function (assumed linear i.e., 
0,)( 1212 
TSOTSOTSO ggc  ) and g₁₂ is the capacity of the link between nodes 1 and 
2.  The KKT conditions for this problem are both necessary and sufficient and since it 











                                 (5.34) 
 The last part of the equilibrium problem is the market-clearing conditions that 
balance the flow controlled by the network operator and thus by producers A and B: 
  free ,0 12121212 BA ffg                                                  (5.35) 
 The LCP for this energy network problem is thus the KKT conditions of the 
producers: (5.28), (5.29), (5.30), (5.31), the nodal market-clearing conditions (5.32), 
the KKT conditions of the TSO (5.34) and the market-clearing conditions of the 
transportation market (5.35).  Figure 5.5 below shows a diagrammatic representation 







Figure 5.5: Representation of Second Network Example 







Dq2  are the variables that are 
integer-constrained in variations 3 and 4. The goal is to find a solution which has 
these variables as integers. Note that there are multiple integer solutions. The values 
for the input parameters as well as the six variations that were tested are shown in 
Table 5.11 below. 










Table 5.11: Dataset Used in Second Network Example 
Parameter Value 
REG
12  0.5 
A
1  10 
B
1  12 
C
2  15 
D





Aq1  10 
Bq1  10 
Cq2  4.5 






 Table 5.12 reports the different variations considered. Again, using SOS Type 
1 variables from Chapter 4, this DC-MLCP can be converted to a two-level problem 





Table 5.12: Description of Formulation Variations for Second Network Example 
Variation ζ-Complementary ε-Integrality Problem Description 
1 No No MLCP 
3 No No Integer variables 
4 Yes No Integer variables 
5 Yes No Continuous variables 
6 No Yes Continuous variables 
7 Yes Yes Continuous variables 
 
 As in the DC-Nash example, several numerical variations were done to see the 
change in solutions. Variation 1 was a mixed-complementary problem (MCP) without 
imposing integer restrictions. Variation 3 involved converting the MCP to a 
formulation with disjunctive constraints but restricting the variables of production and 
sales to be integer. The rest of the variations then go through the different 
combinations as in the DC-Nash example. 
 First, variations 4 and 7 give an integer solution. However, due to the presence 
of multiple equilibria, these solutions need not be unique as in the DC-NASH game. 
Multiple starting points were chosen, and, according to the numerical tests, the 
reported solution had the highest objective function value (along with some other 
equilibria not reported) when a feasible integer solution was desired. Hence, 
variations 4 and 7 can be used to obtain optimal, integer solutions that are feasible. 
Note that variation 6 targets integers through ε-complementarity, while variation 4 





 Similar to the previous example, variation 1 yielded a non-integer but optimal 
and feasible solution while variation 3 was infeasible. Again, this shows that ζ-
complementarity is essential to obtain a feasible integer solution (as in variations 4 
and 7). However, only ζ-complementarity is not enough to obtain integer solutions 
(variation 5) nor is only ε-complementarity (variation 6). 
 The extra advantage of using variations 4 and 7 is that values of dual variables 
can be obtained and interpreted. It is interesting to note that the dual variables change 
from the continuous to the integer case, which is what was expected. However, it also 
shows the differences in solutions with relaxation of integer variables to solve a 
problem and how it leads to solutions that can be very different from the market 
dynamics of an integer constrained problem. Tables 5.13 and 5.14 below display the 





Table 5.13: Results for Second Network Problem (Integer Variables) 
Variations 1 3 4 5 6 7 
As1  7.440 Infeasible 8.000 8.000 8.000 8.000 
Bs1  0.560 Infeasible 0 0 0 0 
Cs2  4.500 Infeasible 4.000 4.500 4.500 4.000 
Ds2  0 Infeasible 0 0 0 0 
Aq1  10.000 Infeasible 10.000 10.000 10.000 10.000 
Bq1  3.000 Infeasible 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 
Cq2  4.500 Infeasible 4.000 4.500 4.500 4.000 
Dq2  0 Infeasible 0 0 0 0 
Sum σ n/a n/a 0.5 0 n/a 0.5 






Table 5.14: Results for Second Network Problem (Other Variables) 
Variations 1 3 4 5 6 7 
Af12  2.560 Infeasible 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 
Bf12  2.440 Infeasible 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 
A
1  2.000 Infeasible 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 
B
1  0 Infeasible 0 0 0 0 
C
2  0.250 Infeasible 0.500 0.250 0.250 0.500 
D
2  0 Infeasible 0 0 0 0 
g₁₂ 5.000 Infeasible 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 
ε₁₂ 2.250 Infeasible 2.500 2.250 2.250 2.500 
A
1  12.000 Infeasible 12.000 12.000 12.000 12.000 
B
1  12.000 Infeasible 12.000 12.000 12.000 12.000 
C
2  15.250 Infeasible 15.500 15.250 15.250 15.500 
D
2  17.581 Infeasible 18.000 18.000 18.000 18.000 
π₁ 12.000 Infeasible 12.000 12.000 12.000 12.000 
π₂ 15.250 Infeasible 15.500 15.250 15.250 15.500 











This chapter improves a methodology to solve discretely-constrained Nash games 
formulated as mixed complementarity problems. The discrete restrictions can lead to 
infeasible solutions, so a relaxation is needed. Along with providing both a 
complementary and integrality relaxation, this chapter uses the technique from 
Chapter 4 to solve the resulting DC-MLCP.  
 The two-level formulation proposed in this chapter gives a new way to look at 
an otherwise one-level problem. First, this formulation shows that there are actually 
two different sets of optimization problems hidden in this one-level problem. One set 
of minimization problems aims to minimize deviations from complementary and 
integrality. The other set of complementary problems aims to solve either a Nash-
Cournot game or a network problem (as the two examples discussed in this chapter; 
there can be other applications). In this way, the two-level approach tackles the 
problem from a different perspective. This perspective, coupled with the solution 
technique from Chapter 4, ends up performing better than the single-stage method of  
(Gabriel et al., 2011a), (Gabriel et al., 2011b). 
 From the theoretical analysis carried out and the examples considered, several 
conclusions can be drawn. First, relaxing both integrality and complementarity in the 
lower-level problem while using the upper-level to minimize deviations enables the 
selection of an integer, equilibrium solution. Second, the method of SOS Type 1 
variables from Chapter 4 proves to be computationally quicker than the method of 
disjunctive constraints for two of the numerical examples illustrated in this chapter. 





example, can lead to different solutions. It also helps analyze the importance of the 
technique to practical examples. 





Chapter 6:  Conclusions 
This chapter provides a summary of the work done in the dissertation. The 
dissertation went through three different types of two-level problems, and provided 
novel solution techniques for each of them. Several applications of these techniques 
were provided to show the nuances of each method. This chapter will start off with 
concluding remarks about each two-level problem studied. Then, the main 
contributions of this dissertation will be listed. Finally, some proposals for future 
work as an extension of the work provided in this dissertation will be presented. 
6.1. Concluding Remarks 
6.1.1. Robust Optimization 
Numerous robust optimization techniques exist in the literature, but the goal of this 
dissertation was to develop a technique which is numerically more efficient than 
previous techniques. Chapter 3 presented a method based on Benders decomposition, 
which was shown to be numerically more efficient when compared to a previous 
method (Li et al., 2006). 
 The modified Benders method was also shown to be computationally 
tractable, in that empirically the increase in the number of function calls was at most 
linear with an increase in variables. Diverse numerical examples were provided to 
show the applicability of the method to different types of problems. 
 Previous methods exist, which could easily solve linear and quadratic robust 





stated in this dissertation, involve nonlinear constraints and objective functions. The 
modified Benders method was shown to be able to tackle these problems, and a 
sampling technique was provided so the user could choose the level of accuracy 
desired. In particular, the engineering design examples showed how the selection of 
an optimal design can vary with the presence of uncertainty. Moreover, the examples 
also showed how the presence of uncertainty degrades objective function 
performance. 
 A final example showed the importance of studying uncertainty to 
environmental market strategies. The future of a carbon tax and retrofitting 
technology is uncertain, and this uncertainty in future events can have important 
implications on decisions made today. As shown in the example, the uncertainty of a 
tax discourages energy intensive infrastructure for today, when the decision maker is 
extremely risk averse. Worries of a larger tax in the future encourages infrastructure 
to not be as energy intensive under a worst-case scenario. 
 The approach presented in this dissertation is designed for robust optimization 
problems with a goal to decrease computational time. One drawback of this approach 
is that there is no built-in verification that the solution is actually robust for nonlinear 
robust optimization problems. Other methods (Gunawan & Azarm, 2004),  (Li et al., 
2006) have optimization problems that verify the solution is robust within the 
approach. Secondly, this approach requires explicit objective and constraint functions 
to be able to work. Simulation or “black box” type problems will not be solved using 
the approach presented in this dissertation. Moreover, this dissertation only provides 





problems with quasiconvex constraints. A mathematical proof would improve the 
validity of the method and is an option for future work. Another area of improvement 
is a better sampling technique than the one presented for nonlinear constraint 
functions. Improvements in sampling and theory might eventually lead to a solution 
technique for general nonlinear robust optimization problems. 
6.1.2. MPECs and EPECs 
Chapter 4 describes a new solution technique for MPECs and EPECs, which was 
developed to solve large-scale problems such as the North American gas model 
MPEC. The new technique was developed to be more computationally efficient than 
previous techniques for solving these problems. A lot of times optimization solvers 
return a solution as infeasible if they are unable to find one for complex problems. 
The aim was to develop a simple enough technique that could be applied to a wide 
variety of problems. 
 The two algorithms presented in Chapter 4 were shown to solve large MPECs 
with much less computational effort when compared to disjunctive constraints and 
also be applicable to complex problems (e.g., the North American gas model) where 
traditional methods had failed. The methods were restricted to be used in problems 
where the KKT conditions were necessary and sufficient, which decreases the 
applicability of various functional forms but still lends itself to different examples. 
 The focus of the examples was on different types of Stackelberg games and 
Nash-Cournot games with a modified structure. The theme of the examples was 





 Various scenarios for shale gas in the United States were developed using the 
North American gas model. The scenarios studied what would happen under a tax for 
shale production, a tax on all natural gas production, and the presence of more shale 
than predicted. One of the main conclusions was that in the presence of a tax, the 
producers pass the tax onto the consumers. Moreover, the top-level firm always 
makes the majority of the profits by manipulating the market. The reality of the 
market situation probably lies somewhere in between that of a Stackelberg game and 
a Nash-Cournot game, but being able to study this formulation was instructive.  
6.1.3. Discretely-Constrained Mixed Linear Complementarity Problems 
The technique presented in Chapter 5 was a new way to solve and think about 
discretely-constrained mixed linear complementary problems. The technique 
provided a way to solve a relaxed version of the problem in one stage, thus converting 
a two-level problem into one level. This conversion into one stage was initially 
achieved using disjunctive constraints, but this meant the solution would depend on a 
large constant. This dissertation used the techniques presented in Chapter 4 to not 
have to use disjunctive constraints when finding solutions to DC-MLCPs. 
 The first set of numerical examples studied discretely-constrained Nash-
Cournot games. While the continuous versions of these games have been extensively 
studied, imposing discrete restrictions might lead to infeasibility. Hence, relaxing the 
integer restrictions as well as the complementary conditions, while targeting specific 
integer values, provided a solution to these games. The computational effort was also 
abated using SOS Type 1 variables as opposed to disjunctive constraints. In all 





with the integer restrictions. Two different variations were provided to be able to 
obtain integer solutions to DC-Nash games. 
 The second set of numerical examples studied discretely-constrained network 
problems. Network problems can also be expressed as complementary problems, and 
adding the discrete restrictions would yield the same problems of infeasibility as the 
discretely-constrained Nash games. Again, different variations were studied to see 
which one yielded an integer solution. Two variations, the same ones that worked for 
the discretely-constrained Nash games, worked for these network problems as well. 
Dual variables are often used in network problems to obtain shadow prices, and this 
technique helped obtaining these prices. However, the applicability of these prices is 
still a matter of debate as the complementary and integrality relaxations also factor 
into these prices. 
 Another advantage of using the technique outlined in this dissertation was that 
a tradeoff between complementary and integrality can be obtained. This was 
numerically shown by studying different variations in Chapter 5.   
6.2. Main Contributions 
This dissertation is focused on solving three specific types of two-level problems. 
However, these three types of problems have been chosen to be the ones that best 
encompass the class of two-level problems. First, robust optimization is a two-level 
problem where the lower-level can be thought of as checking the feasibility of an 
upper-level decision. In this way, the lower-level aims to check feasibility, but does 
not have an objective or goal for itself. For MPECs and EPECs, the lower-level is  





upper-level objective. While the lower-level alters the feasible space for the upper-
level problem, the focus is on influencing the objective function of the upper-level 
problem. Thus, these two types of two-level problems encompass dealing with 
influence of the lower-level on constraints (robust optimization) and objective 
function (MPECs) of the upper-level directly, and indirectly the objective function 
(robust optimization) and constraints (MPECs) of the upper-level. Finally, the third 
type of problem is something which starts off with a one-level structure, but is 
converted to two levels to be able to solve more easily.  
 The first main contribution of this dissertation is the application of 
decomposition techniques to two-level problems, which helps convert them to a 
single one-level problem (as in the case of MPECs, EPECs, and DC-MLCPs), or a 
series of one-level problems that can be solved iteratively (as in the case of robust 
optimization). This use of decomposition techniques provides insight that could not 
be achieved through a two-level analysis, for example, the robust feasible region for 
robust optimization problems, the absolute value function equality in MPECs and 
EPECs, and obtaining shadow prices from DC-MLCPs. These decomposition 
techniques are presented in a way to take advantage of the problem structure, and 
obtain a solution that can relate to the original problem. 
 The second main contribution of this dissertation is to provide methods that 
greatly speed up computation time for two-level problems. Robust optimization 
problems have been traditionally solved using a nested inner-outer structure which 
takes a lot of computational effort. MPECs and EPECs have been solved using 





because of the presence of binary variables, but also require the selection of a large 
constant which is not immediately obvious. DC-MLCPs have been solved either 
successively fixing and relaxing discrete variables or using disjunctive constraints, 
both of which are computationally more expensive than the methods provided in this 
dissertation. In particular, the method for MPECs can be applied to a host of other 
problems to speed up computation wherever a product of two terms resulting in a 
nonlinear function is present. 
 The third main contribution of this dissertation is applying the theory to an 
extremely diverse set of examples. The dissertation contains examples from 
environmental markets, energy markets, power systems, structural optimization, 
engineering design, networks, and game theory. These same examples can also be 
split into academic subjects of operations research, economics, mechanical 
engineering, and market design. A host of such examples serves the academic 
community well, as it outlines the importance of research into the theory of two-level 
problems. 
6.3. Future Research 
6.3.1. Multiobjective Mixed-Integer Robust Optimization 
There are two natural ways to develop the ideas presented for robust optimization. 
These ideas arise out of the methods developed in the dissertation, and it is 
convenient that this direction is shared by current research as well. 
 Many engineering design applications involve multiobjective optimization. 





robust optimization problems would be useful. Since the modified Benders method 
has already converted the two-level problem into a single-level, combining it with 
traditional methods of multiobjective optimization would be natural. For example, if 
the robust feasible region is provided, any multiobjective method can be applied. 
Hence, each stage of the modified Benders decomposition method can involve 
solving a multiobjective problem. Since the modified Benders method is gradient-
based, it would make sense to combine it with another gradient-based method such as 
Normal Boundary intersection or one of its variations (Siddiqui et al., 2011d). Each 
step of the Normal Boundary intersection method provides one point on the Pareto 
frontier. The modified Benders method would be used at each step to come up with 
one robust Pareto point, thus generating a robust Pareto frontier. 
 The second natural extension has to do with solving mixed-integer robust 
optimization problems. Standard Benders decomposition is already applicable to 
mixed-integer optimization problems. Thus, a variation can easily be considered 
which contains standard Benders cuts and modified Benders cuts to solve a robust 
mixed-integer optimization problem. These two ideas can then be combined to solve 
a mixed-integer robust optimization problems.  
6.3.2. Solving Nonlinear MPECs and EPECs 
The methods presented in this dissertation were only applicable to MPECs and 
EPECs which comprised of optimization problems where the KKT conditions were 
necessary and sufficient. However, to obtain local solutions to nonlinear programs an 
approximation scheme can be developed where the lower level problem is locally 





interpolation could have the KKT conditions necessary and sufficient within a 
specified interval. 
 An easier task would be to consider the case where the KKT conditions might 
just be necessary (or sufficient) and develop an approximation scheme from there. In 
particular, if the product of two terms becomes complicated, other approximation 
techniques may be studied.  
6.3.3. Solving Large-Scale Mixed-Integer Complementary Problems 
The relaxation techniques put into the DC-MLCPs in Chapter 5 were not put to the 
test on larger problems. There might be even better ways to approximate the 
relaxation of complementarity. For example, a nonlinear function describing the 
product might be added as a constraint.  
 In many cases, the formulation might yield a simple way to both add 
relaxations and approximate the lower-level product at the same time. This can then 
be tested on large mixed-integer complementarity problems, solutions to which can 







Appendix A: Robust Optimization Test Problems 
For examples 2 to 4: 1.0,1.0,1.0,1,1 `3`2`121  xqqqq . 
(Example 2) 
                     
    
   
2 2
1 2 3 4
1 1 1 2
2 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 1 1 2 2 2




0, 0, 0, 0
ˆ ˆ: , , ,
x
x x x x
s t
q q x x
q q x x
x x x x
where q q q q q q
     
   
   
       
       
                               (A1)                              
Table A1: Solution to Example 2 




Li et al.‟s (2006)  
Solution 
x1 0.5 0.45 0.375 
x2 0.5 0.45 0.375 
x3 1 0.90 0.416 
x4 0 0 0.416 
f(x) 9.02 9.145 9.268 
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0, 0, 0, 0
ˆ ˆ: , , , , ,
x
x x x x
s t
q q x x
q q x x
x x x x
where q q q q q q x x x x x
     
   
   
       
            
     (A2) 
Table A2: Solution to Example 3 




Li et al.‟s (2006)  
Solution 
x1 0.5 0.45 0.375 
x2 0.5 0.45 0.375 
x3 1 0.10 0.416 
x4 0 0.70 0.416 
f(x) 9.02 9.145 9.268 
Function Calls 7 21 2808 
 
(Example 4) 
     
    
     
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1 2 3 4
1 1 1 2
2 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3




0, 0, 0, 0
ˆ ˆ, , , , ,
x
x x x x
s t
q q x x
q q x x
x x x x
where q q q q q q x x x x x
    
   
   
       
            
          (A3)         





Table A3: Solution to Example 4 




Li et al.‟s (2006)  
Solution 
x1 0.5 0.45 0.40 
x2 0.5 0.45 0.40 
x3 1 0.90 0.40 
x4 0 0 0.40 
f(x) 9.77 9.8850 9.92 
Function Calls 7 21 2592 
 
(Example 5) 
0.1x p        
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Table A4: Solution to Example 5 




Li et al.‟s (2006)  
Solution 
x1 -4.00 -3.40 1.04 
x2 -5.00 -4.90 -4.53 
x3 5.00 5.00 5.00 
x4 -5.00 -5.00 -0.37 
x5 5.00 5.00 5.00 
f(x) -23.00 -21.50 -20.75 
Function Calls 5 17 7856 
 
(Example 6) 
1.0`  px   
































Table A5: Solution to Example 6 




Li et al.‟s (2006)  
Solution 
x1 -5.00 -4.90 -4.23 
x2 -5.00 -4.90 -4.52 
x3 5.00 5.00 5.00 
x4 -3.82 -4.27 -3.67 
x5 5.00 5.00 5.00 
f(x) -31.21 -29.79 -28.36 
Function Calls 5 17 11099 
 
(Hock 100) 
This is problem 100 modified from (Hock & Schittkowski, 1980). 1.0`  px  
































































Table A6: Solution to Hock 100
 




Li et al.‟s (2006)  
Solution 
x1 2.3304 2.2350 - 
x2 1.9514 1.8546 - 
x3 -0.4775 -0.4749 - 
x4 4.3657 4.3533 - 
x5 -0.6245 -0.6251 - 
x6 1.0381 1.0359 - 
x7 1.5942 1.5970 - 
f(x) 680.6301 692.3847 - 







(Hock 106)  
1.0`  px             
                                     

























































Table A7: Solution to Hock 106 




Li et al.‟s (2006)  
Solution 
x1 579.32 388.73 - 
x2 1359.94 1540.21 - 
x3 5110.07 5290.11 - 
x4 182.02 150.89 - 
x5 295.60 288.40 - 
x6 217.98 209.11 - 
x7 286.42 262.49 - 
x8 395.60 388.40 - 
f(x) 7049.33 7219.06 - 










Appendix B: Discussion on Function Calls 
One of the benchmarks of a useful algorithm is that it is uses less computational effort 
than other algorithms. One way to measure computational effort of an algorithm is a 
comparison of CPU time, i.e., how fast the algorithm can solve certain test problems 
when compared to others. However, CPU time can vary with the type of computer 
used, other programs running in the background, and other factors that are machine 
dependent. 
 Measuring the number of function calls is a measure of computational effort 
that is machine independent. Moreover, measuring computational efficiency in terms 
of function calls can better estimate how the algorithm will perform for different 
types of problems (e.g., black box or simulation-based design).  
 This dissertation defines function calls as any instances where the solver calls 
an objective function, constraint, or other value or assignment in the optimization 
problem. This is based on the definition of a statement execution in GAMS, which is 
defined as any instance where the solver calls an equation or other value or 
assignment in the optimization problem (GAMS, 2010). This definition was chosen in 
part because the modified Benders method was programmed and tested in GAMS. 
 This definition is also similar to the other definitions of function calls in the 
recent literature. The definition by (Hu et al., 2011) is that a “function call refers to 
one instance of calculating objective and constraint functions altogether (i.e., one call 
to the optimization problem).” The authors (Hu et al., 2011) have used MATLAB to 
solve their test problems, and their definition depends on their use of MATLAB 





like GAMS, but the method of (Hu et al., 2011) entails putting the objective and 
constraint functions in one “m-file” and attaching a function call counter within this 
file. Note it is not possible to place a similar counter in GAMS because the GAMS 
file structure is different than MATLAB. Another definition is offered by (Li et al., 
2011), who define function calls “equal to the number of points that have been 
evaluated during one run of the optimizer.” The authors in (Li et al., 2011) used the 
solver XPRESS (XPRESS, 2003) for their test problems.  
 Since all problems except one (Heat Exchanger Design in Section 3.5.3 was 
solved using MATLAB) were solved in GAMS, the following example provides a 
basis for comparison for function call counting in GAMS and MATLAB. This is the 
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 This problem (B1) was solved using both GAMS and MATLAB. The values 
of N were changed to give an idea of computational effort for MATLAB and GAMS 
















100 102 506 5493 
200 202 607 8210 
300 302 913 12252 
400 402 1201 17786 
500 502 1403 20096 
     
 Clearly, even though we are careful in using the same definition for 
MATLAB and GAMS, there is a difference in counting function calls for these 
programs. Roughly, the function calls in GAMS are an order of magnitude or two 
lower for example (B1). This difference should be kept in mind when looking at the 
examples in this dissertation. Just to note, the function calls for the Heat Exchanger 
example (Section 3.5.3) were reported using the counting method for MATLAB. The 
results on maximum function calls presented in Table 3.1 are also applicable to both 
methods of counting since they talk about the maximum possible function calls, and 
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